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Abstract
My dissertation consists of three chapters. The common theme that unifies the chapters
is the analysis of how globalization and trade impact labor market outcomes. In the first
chapter, I summarize the literature on this theme and analyze the shortcomings that are
present in existing works. In the early 1990s, a large body of work was developed that
showed that many of the predictions of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory failed to
hold in the data. As a result, many authors disregarded increased trade and globalization
as a possible driving force behind the observed changes in labor market outcomes.
However, in more recent years, authors have begun modifying new trade theories to
begin to explore how trade and globalization might impact wages and unemployment
through different channels. In this chapter, I summarize the innovations that have
occurred along these lines, as well as the empirical support that exists for the proposed
theories.
The second chapter of my dissertation explores the business cycle effects of increased
globalization. Over the past 20 years, following recessions, recoveries in labor markets
have been slow and weak relative to their post-war average. Over the same period, the
United States has become increasingly open to trade and global forces. In this chapter of
the thesis, I argue that changes in labor market outcomes can be tied to increased glob-
alization. I build a model in which increased openness to growing economies generates a
downward trend in employment which is amplified by recessions, thus generating jobless
recoveries. I provide empirical evidence for the relationship between globalization and
labor market outcomes and I show that the model is able to qualitatively match not
only the targeted changes in labor markets, but also a persistent negative trade balance
and increasing income inequality.
In the third chapter of my dissertation, I explore the impact that trade has upon in-
vestment in technologies that are skill-augmenting and how this, in turn, impacts the
relative return to skilled labor. In the decade following the Mexico-U.S. trade integra-
tion, the manufacturing skill premium rose by almost 60 percent in Mexico and by only
12 percent in the U.S. Standard trade theory predicts that when countries with different
iii
levels of skilled labor integrate, the skill premium should fall - not rise - in the skill-
scarce country. In the third chapter, I reconcile theory and data by building a model
in which intermediate goods are produced using rented technology. After integration,
producers in Mexico begin to rent technologies from the United States, which are more
advanced and, hence, more skill-intensive. This has two effects: The skill premium in
Mexico rises due to adoption of the more advanced technology and the skill premium
in the U.S. rises due to increased investment in this technology, which is driven by the
increased marginal return on technology arising from to its adoption in Mexico. The
mechanism is supported by industry-level evidence: Mexican industries which are in-
tegrated into the U.S. supply chain have higher skill premia than their non-integrated
counterparts. The calibrated model can account for about two-thirds of the increase in
the skill premium in each country.
iv
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Chapter 1
Critical Literature Reveiw
1.1 Introduction
In the last three decades, labor markets have experienced dramatic changes. Wage in-
equality has increased dramatically in a number of countries and labor market down
turns following recessions in the United States have become more prolonged and their re-
coveries have become less robust. These changes have been accompanied by the decline
of labor unions, increased international competition in the form of trade and inter-
national financial flows, and changes in technology that potentially favor more skilled
workers. As such, much attention has been focused on determining which, if any, of
these forces may be responsible for the changes in labor market outcomes that have
occurred. In this paper, I will focus on the impact of globalization, though the other
explanations have also been explored to a great extent.
Trade, offshoring, declining tariffs, and international capital flows have all experi-
enced a marked increase over the period of interest. Developed and developing countries
have become more integrated and their economies have become more interdependent.
The fact that increased globalization coincided with the observed changes in labor mar-
ket outcomes naturally led to the hypothesis that the two were interrelated. Traditional
trade theory has strong predictions for what should occur when trade between coun-
tries with different factor abundances begin to trade; the Heckscher-Ohlin theory-the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem in particular-tells us that trade increases the return to the
abundant factor in each of the trade partners. That is, inequality between skilled and
1
2unskilled workers should increase in a skill-abundant country and decrease in a skill-
scarce one following a trade liberalization between the two. Until the recent past, this
was the leading theory used to explore the impact of integration between more and less
developed countries. However, a number of predictions of the basic Heckscher-Ohlin
theory do not hold in the data. Furthermore, traditional trade theory tends to deal
with changes in steady states as a result of long-term changes in trade policy. As such,
it has no predictions for how economic variables will respond to business cycles in a
world with more free flow of goods and capital between countries.
There is a large literature that documents the failures of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) provide a nice summary of the work that has been done
to show the failure of the Stolper-Samuelson theory for developing countries. Follow-
ing trade liberalizations, inequality grew in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
India, and Mexico. Moreover,Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) show that within in-
dustry demand for skilled workers increased during the 1980s and after, whereas the H-O
theory predicts that the shift in demand should occur across sectors. Finally, Lawrence
and Slaughter (1993) document that the relative price of skill-intensive goods increases
following trade liberalizations, while the H-O theory predicts that this price should fall.
This evidence led many economist to disregard trade as a candidate explanation for
changes in labor demand and rising inequality and, instead, postulate that technologi-
cal change led to the increase in demand for skilled workers. Recently, however, there
has been a resurgence of interest in globalization as a root cause of the observed changes
in labor market outcomes. Authors have begun to turn to new trade theories or make
modifications to the standard framework, incorporating trade in tasks, heterogeneous
firms, innovation and investment, labor market frictions, and consumer-based theories
in order to revisit the potential impact of trade on labor markets. This literature has
been guided by new empirical evidence which shows that each of these factors may be
important in matching the data.
For the purpose of this review, I will use “trade” and “globalization” interchange-
ably and these terms will encapsulate trade in goods and services, offshoring, and foreign
direct investment. I will concentrate on the effects of globalization, though there is a
large and growing literature on the impacts of other forces on labor market outcomes.
3Although other hypotheses about the root causes of increasing inequality and unem-
ployment exist, I will consider them outside the scope of this work and will, instead,
focus only on the models and data that focus on the impacts of trade and globalization.
I will predominantly discuss the literature on inequality due to the vast literature deal-
ing with this topic; I will additionally touch on studies that deal with employment and
labor force participation effects of globalization, which are not as plentiful.
The rest of this review is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical
literature on trade and labor market outcomes, emphasizing new developments and
modifications to older theory which have been made in order to be more consistent with
empirical evidence. Section 3 reviews the empirical support for the proposed theories,
as well as the evidence on the implications of these models. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Studies
As inequality began to grow in a number of economies in the 1980s, researchers became
increasingly dissatisfied with the inability of standard trade theories to account for new
observations from the data regarding labor market impacts of trade liberalizations. In
particular, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory was unable to account for growing inequality in
both advanced and developing countries following trade liberalizations. Moreover, it
had no predictions for how employment and labor force participation would respond to
such a liberalization. As such, people began to modify existing theories to make them
better able to match observations from the data. In this section, I will review major
works in the theoretical literature which modify trade theory to address its inability to
match observables from the data.
1.2.1 Comparative Advantage and Trade in Tasks
Traditional trade theory has centered around the idea that trade between countries
occurs due to comparative advantage. A strand of literature has built upon this idea,
including trade in tasks which is driven by relative abundance of factors of production
or comparative advantage. In this section, I will describe four such studies.
The first of these studies is Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), which explores the impact
of offshoring upon wages in an advanced country (the United States) and in a developing
4one (Mexico). They build a simple model of trade in tasks in order to explore how
foreign direct investment (FDI), in the form of transfer of physical capital, impacts the
relative wages of less skilled workers in the context of a two-country model. A single
good is produced competitively by combining a continuum of intermediate goods. The
intermediate goods, in turn, are produced by combining both skilled- and unskilled-
labor with capital. In the initial two-country equilibrium, the factor endowments are
sufficiently different the the factor prices are not equalized across the two countries;
specifically, the return to capital in the North is lower than in the South and the ratio
of skilled to unskilled wages is also lower in the North. They assume that the flow of
capital from the North to the South is exogenously restricted and then they consider
the policy experiment where this restriction is lifted. If the intermediate goods, z, are
ordered from the least skill-intensive to the most skill-intensive, then there will be a
cutoff, z∗, which at which all intermediates that are more skill intensive, z ∈ (z∗, 1], will
be produced in the North and all intermediates that are less skill-intensive, z ∈ [0, z∗],
will be produced in the South. This is because the endowment of skilled workers is such
that skilled workers are relatively cheap in the North as compared to the South. So,
the production of high-skill intensive intermediates will concentrate in the North and
low-skill intensive intermediates will be produced in the South. When the restriction
to the flow of capital is reduced, the higher rate of return on this capital in the South
causes capital to flow from the North to the South. This, in turn, causes the equilibrium
cutoff point to increase to z∗∗ > z∗. Therefore, the offshore production of intermediates
increases the level of skill-intensity of production in both countries, since now the most
skill intensive good produced in the South is more skill intensive than in the initial
equilibrium and the least skill-intensive good produced in the North is also more-skill
intensive than in the previous equilibrium. This causes the demand for skilled workers
to increase in both countries, hence driving up the relative wage of skilled workers in
both countries. They think of this as endogenous technical change, but in reality, there
is no change in the technology used to produce the intermediates in either country.
Rather, the flow of capital is what is driving this change. Feenstra and Hanson were
among the first to show that trade is not necessarily inconsistent with rising skill premia
in both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries.
The more recent works of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Costinot and Vogel
5(2010), and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) also utilize the idea that trade in tasks
or intermediates can yield results that differ from the Stolper-Samuelson predictions,
even when trade is driven by comparative advantage. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
set up a model that is very similar to that of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) to em-
phasize that offshoring can result in a Pareto improvement in the North under certain
conditions. They focus on the outcomes in the skill-abundant country and are not con-
cerned with outcomes in the low-skill abundant trading partner. In this model, there
are two goods, X and Y , each produced by combining a continuum of tasks which are
produced by high-skill workers and a continuum of tasks that are produced by low-skill
workers. Industry X is relatively skill-intensive, meaning that producing a high-skilled
task requires relatively more labor in industry X than it does in industry Y . Firms can
undertake tasks either at home or abroad and they have an incentive to offshore tasks
to the foreign country because low skill labor is relatively inexpensive in the foreign
country due to its relative abundance there. Some tasks may be more difficult to off-
shore than others, which they model as a function which increases the amount of labor
input needed to produce the task. Let aLjbe the amount of domestic labor required to
produce a low-skill task (L-task) i for industry j; then aLjβtj(i) units are required to
produce that same task abroad with βtj(i) ≥ 1 so that the task requires relatively more
inputs to produce abroad. They suggest that this distortion could arise from costly
monitoring of foreign production. They assume that the function tj(i) is increasing in i
so that more complicated tasks are more difficult to offshore (assuming that the tasks
are ranked from least to most complicated). They focus on the offshoring of L-tasks and
assume that it is too costly or complicated to offshore all other tasks. If w is the wage
of a domestic low-skill worker and w∗is the wage of a foreign low-skill worker, there will
be a cutoff task I such that
w = w∗βtL(I)
so that all tasks i ∈ [0, I] are performed offshore and all tasks i ∈ (I, 1] are performed
at home. Then, for given factor prices, the low-skill labor costs for a domestic producer
are reduced by a proportion Ω(I) due to the ability to offshore all tasks i ∈ [0, I].
Because the firms are competitive, zero profit conditions must hold and so this reduction
in costs translates into increased wages for the low-skilled workers. Specifically, the
6wages increase by a proportion 1/Ω(I). There is no impact upon the wages of the high-
skill workers. Hence, they show that a Pareto improvement is possible. The low-skill
workers are benefiting because offshoring essentially increases their productivity. The
foreign low-skill workers now do the menial tasks that allow the home low-skill workers
to concentrate on the more advanced low-skill tasks.
This result is closely related to Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) and, in fact, arises
as a special case of their model. The result also may not hold if the home country in
question is a large economy and offshoring has terms of trade effects. For showing that
the Pareto improvement is possible, they have assumed that both countries are small
open economies and so do not have an effect on the relative prices of the two goods
(X and Y ). However, because offshoring essentially increases the supply of low-skill
laborers in the home country, it increases the output of the unskilled-intensive good Y .
If this country were sufficiently large to have an impact on the relative price of Y , then
an increase in production of the good would push its price down and the conventional
Stolper-Samuelson logic would apply. This mitigates some of the wage benefits enjoyed
by low-skill workers in the small open economy set up and, in fact, can overturn the
result. Moreover, if there were only production of the skill-intensive good at home,
increasing the supply of unskilled labor via offshoring would decrease the low skill wage
even in the small open economy set up. The result is an interesting one, but arises only
under a very special set of assumptions.
Costinot and Vogel (2010) also build a two country model with a continuum of
goods, which are each produced using labor but differ in their skill intensities. They
are not concerned with the skill premium, but rather, the whole distribution of wages.
There is a continuum of skill levels and, hence, a continuum of income levels. Output
per worker , A, in a given industry is determined by its skill intensity, σ, and the skill
level of the worker, s. So, A is a function, A(s, σ), and its increasing in s and satisfies
the condition
A(s′, σ′)
A(s, σ′)
>
A(s′, σ)
A(s, σ)
for any s, s′, σ, σ′ which are such that s′ > s and σ′ > σ. This last condition just
tells us that skill is more valuable in industries that are highly skill intensive. Therefore,
higher skill workers will match with more skill intensive industries. They embed this into
7a world with trade in which the home country is more skill abundant than the Foreign
country. Trade will then increase income inequality at home, across the entire income
distribution. The most basic model will have strong Stolper-Samuelson effects, with
income inequality falling in the foreign country. However, they make a modification to
reverse this result. They show that if technology is more productive in the home country
and it can be used by offshore foreign workers, then income inequality may rise in the
foreign country. They also show that North-North trade can also result in rising income
inequality in both countries, a result which was previously not possible in models where
comparative advantage was the basis for trade.
In Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012), the authors build on Costinot and Vogel
(2010) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2011) to explore the impact of interdependent
global supply chains on within country income inequality. In their model, there are two
countries, each with a continuum of workers that are heterogeneous in their skill level.
Production of the single final good is sequential, so in order to produce an intermediate,
σ+dσ, an intermediate from the previous stage, σ, is combined with labor. The amount
of output depends on the skill level of the worker producing it. This leads to more skilled
workers sorting to produce more “advanced” intermediates. They then compare what
happens under autarky to outcomes under free trade in order to see how the globalization
of the supply chain impacts inequality. They have in mind trade between advanced and
developing countries, so there is a difference in the relative supply of skills across the
two countries. Comparing the free trade equilibrium to the autarkic one, they show
that in the South, free trade results in “stage downgrading” of all Southern workers,
meaning that workers in the South match to produce relatively less advanced parts.
The converse is true for the North. This results in decreased wage inequality amongst
low-skill workers and increased wage inequality amongst high-skill workers in the South.
The converse is true in the North. This result is not about inequality across high- and
low-skilled laborers, but rather about the distribution of wages. In other words, there
is wage compression at the bottom of the wage distribution and wage dispersion at
the top of the distribution in the South and, conversely, dispersion at the bottom and
compression at the top in the North. This comes about because of the sequential nature
of production. The standard Stolper-Samuelson effect is causing the compression at the
bottom of the wage distribution in the South. The wage dispersion at the top of the
8distribution is coming about essentially because of cost savings; increased globalization
decreases the relative price of the intermediates used by the high-skill workers to produce
the last intermediates in the sequence.
These papers and others like them which concentrate on trade in tasks offer possi-
ble mechanisms for rising wage inequality in both advanced and developing countries.
However, they are primarily theoretical and are difficult to match up to data. Because
of this, it’s unclear how well the proposed mechanisms operate in practice.
1.2.2 Modifications to the Eaton-Kortum Model of Trade
The model described in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003) has become the basis of a large literature on the impacts of trade. More
recently, authors have begun to embed several types of labor into this model in order
to explore its implications for inequality. Before I describe those studies, I will first
review the basics of Eaton and Kortum (2002) (henceforth EK) and Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (henceforth, BEJK). There are N countries and a contin-
uum of goods which are produced by firms that are either perfectly competitive (EK)
or Bertrand competitors (BEJK). There are Ricardian differences in technological effi-
ciency across producers and countries, with the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity being
drawn from a Frechet distribution. Labor is the only factor of production. Because
of the competitive nature of firms, the lowest cost producer of any given variety will
produce that variety; trade costs and the productivity draw of firms jointly determine
the lowest cost producer of a given variety. If a domestic firm were to be the lowest cost
producer of a good before trade liberalization, there is a chance that it will no longer be
after a reduction in trade costs. Therefore, trade liberalizations impact the amount of
production that takes place within a given country by affecting which country is home
to the lowest cost producer. This induces reallocation of labor across firms in response
to a trade liberalization.
These basic versions of the model only has one type of labor and, so, are not suitable
for exploring the impact of trade liberalization upon inequality between different types
of workers. Burstein and Vogel (2012) modify BEJK to include both high- and low-
skilled workers, allowing for the firm’s technology draw to be more complementary
with high-skilled workers. The model is sufficiently flexible that the extent to which
9technology is or is not skill-augmenting depends on the value of a particular parameter.
This can easily be seen in the following equation, which determined the equilibrium
ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers of a sector j producer in country i with
productivity z:
h
l
=
αj
1− αj
(
si
wi
)−ρ
zϕ
where ϕis the parameter that governs the extent to which technology is skill-biased.
If ϕ > 0, then factor reallocation towards higher productivity firms will raise the relative
demand for skilled workers and, hence, the skill premium. They dub this the “skill-
biased technology mechanism.” In the absence of idiosyncratic productivities, z, this
equation would be simply
h
l
=
αj
1− αj
(
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wi
)−ρ
which is a more familiar equation that arises out of an extension of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In this equation, the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers, ρ, and sector characteristics, αj , determine the extent to which wages and
relative demand for workers track one another. In this set up, changes in trade costs
shift factors of production towards a country’s comparative advantage sector and raise
the relative return to the factor that is used intensively in that sector. This is called
the H-O mechanism by Burstein and Vogel. They embed these two forces into the
quantitative framework of BEJK in order to quantify the impact of the reallocation
that occurs as part of trade liberalizations upon the skill premium. They find that
the skill-biased technology mechanism dominates and the skill premium goes up in all
countries due to reallocation of labor toward the more productive, and hence, more
skill-intensive firms within an industry and country. The real wage of both types of
workers rises, but it rises by more for the skilled workers. They do not find very large
increases in the skill premium, but they are among the first authors to show that a model
calibrated to match firm-, sector-, and aggregate-level data can generate increasing skill
premia in many countries, including the skill-scarce ones.
Kondo (2012) combines the BEJK model with a baseline monopolistic competition
model of trade akin to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) in order to assess the impact of trade
upon local labor market outcomes. He specifically wants to see if this type of model
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can replicate the facts from the data that at the local-metropolitan statistical area
or commuting zone-level, import competition is associated with less employment, less
labor force participation, reduced job creation, and increased job destruction. The idea
behind combining the two types of models is that there may be some goods that are
sufficiently differentiated that they will not have close substitutes that will be produced
abroad and therefore those buisnesses will not be impacted by trade. However, there are
a number of goods which are not very different from something that a foreign producer
could make and so are going to be produced by the lowest-cost producer. If localities
differ in terms of how many of each type of firm exists within its boarders, this will
produce differences in the extent to which different localities are impacted by a trade
liberalization. He includes labor market frictions in order to generate unemployment at
the local level. He is able to generate varying responses to foreign competition, with
employment rates falling dramatically as trade costs increase and falling by much more
in localities with a high concentration of BEJK-type firms.
These modifications help to bridge the gap between more modern trade theory and
those models that were built to assess the impact of trade on different factors of pro-
duction. They show that even when comparative advantage is the basis for trade, as
in Burstein and Vogel (2012), it is still possible for reallocation to result in increased
inequality across workers and decreased employment in areas which compete directly
with foreign imports.
1.2.3 Trade and Innovation
Another strand of the literature has focused upon how trade changes investment or
innovation decisions. This strand of the literature tends to focus on modeling either
technological upgrading in order to gain access to export markets or the import of
capital equipment, which is thought to embody technology that is skill-augmenting.
Quality Upgrading
A number of studies focus on quality upgrading, either to produce goods that can be
exported or to gain supremacy over competitors. Segerstrom and Dinopoulos (1999)
explore the idea that investment in research and development (R&D) can be affected
by export opportunities and competition. They build a two country growth model
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with a continuum of industries. Firms compete for dominance through investment in
R&D; they gain dominance by having the most advanced (or productive) technology.
The most productive firm captures the entire market for that industry. The dominant
firm’s price is limited by the marginal cost of the next-best available technology. Each
country exports the products for which the industry leader happens to be a domestic
firm. Because tariffs cut into the leader’s profits, trade liberalization promotes growth
by causing the marginal product of innovation to increase, relative to the high tariff
regime. If research and development is a skill-intensive activity, then trade liberalization
will, in turn, increase the demand for skilled workers. This story is not built upon the
more productive technology being more skill-augmenting, so it stands apart from the
other studies in the literature. It also would be a set-up in which North-North trade
could induce increased inequality, since it is plausible that both countries invest more
in innovation activities, driving the demand for skilled labor up in both countries.
The next three papers use a Melitz-type model to explore how heterogeneous firms
respond to trade liberalizations. Verhoogen (2008) builds a small open economy Melitz
(2003) model in which consumers in different countries differ in terms of their willingness
to pay for higher quality goods in order to explore wage inequality in developing coun-
tries. There are three key features of his model. First, as in any Melitz model, plants are
heterogeneous in productivity and there is a fixed cost to entering the export market,
which results in the export market being limited to only the most productive firms.
Second, goods are differentiated in terms of quality and he employs a non-homothetic
utility function so that consumers with higher incomes have a higher willingness to pay
for high quality goods than their low-income counterparts. Therefore, firms in a devel-
oping country produce higher quality items for export than for domestic consumption.
Lastly, producing higher quality goods requires better technology and more high-quality
labor and higher quality workers require higher wages. Therefore, trade liberalization
that results in increased incentive to export generates what Verhoogen calls “differential
quality upgrading,” where the most productive firms (the exporters) increase exports in
response to a trade shock. This results in production of more high-quality goods and,
hence, increased wages for high-quality workers. Verhoogen focuses on within industry
inequality, meaning the variance in wages across firms. It is possible that this same
mechanism would produce inequality across workers of skill levels, but this is not the
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focus of his paper.
Rian˜o (2009) also builds a Meltiz-style model in which firms can choose to invest in a
technology which is skill-augmenting. In his set-up, technology is a random variable, but
its realization can be impacted through investment. The firm can choose which “type”
of technology to invest in, meaning it can impact the mean realization of the technology,
but the actual realization will also be subject to an exogenous shock. He models two
different types of technology; the first is a low average productivity technology with low
fixed cost of operation and the other has high average productivity but a high fixed cost
of operation. As in Melitz, the firms which receive high productivity draws are those
that will export and the lowest productivity firms will exit. Therefore, when the country
opens to trade, the firms with the highest draws will begin to export and those with
the lowest draws will exit. This has two effects; the increased profitability arising from
access to exporting also induces the productive firms to invest in the more productive
technology. Therefore, these firms become both even more productive and, therefore,
more skill intensive. There is also a reallocation of workers from the exiting (less skill-
intensive) firms to the larger, more-skill intensive firms. So, the trade liberalization
causes an increase in the skill premium via this reallocation and via increased investment
in the more productive technology. Rian˜o calibrates his model to match moments of the
data from Mexico and finds that, though this mechanism is present, it can only account
for about 12% of the increase in the skill premium in Mexico.
Bustos (2011) also embeds a choice of technology within a standard Melitz (2003)
model. In her model, firms choose how advanced of a technology to use, as well as
making a decision as to whether or not to export. The most productive firms enter the
export market because their profits are sufficiently high that they cover the fixed cost
of entry. Moreover, these same firms will incur the cost to operate the more advanced
technology. This comes about because the benefits of adoption are proportional to
revenues, while its cost is fixed. Therefore, the most productive firms (those with the
highest revenues) are the most likely to adopt the more advanced technology. Bustos
does not focus on the skill premium. Instead, she empirically and theoretically examines
the impact of this mechanism upon the skill-intensities of Argentine industries and finds
that exporting is associated with higher skill intensities. She also examines how the firm
choice of which technology to operate (more or less skill-intensive) is affected by trade
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liberalization and finds, as does Rian˜o, that high productivity firms are likely to upgrade
to the more skill-intensive technology and low productivity firms are likely to downgrade
to the less skill-intensive technology following a trade liberalization.
Trade and Investment in Skill-Augmenting Capital
Another set of papers focuses on the impact of investment in capital equipment on rel-
ative wages. This literature draws upon the seminal contribution of Krusell, Ohanian,
Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) (henceforth KORV), which makes the observation that
the dramatic decrease in the relative price of capital equipment coincides with the in-
crease in the relative wage of highly educated workers in the United States. KORV
then develops a production function in which capital equipment is relatively comple-
mentary with skilled labor and substitutes for unskilled labor. Capital structures are
complementary with all the other factors of production. In keeping with this idea, Goel
(2012) explores the idea that investment in capital equipment is impacted by an in-
dustry’s use of intermediate imports in the context of a two country trade model. She
builds a model in which capital equipment combines with skilled labor in order to make
one “skilled good.” Unskilled labor can be substituted with intermediate imports from
low-wage countries. The composite of these two factors of production, the “unskilled
good,” then combines with the skilled good in order to make one unit of an intermediate.
The intermediates are then aggregated to make a final consumption good. She allows
for innovation which results in the production of a new variety. Innovative activities
use capital and skilled labor as inputs. The countries differ in their endowments of
skilled and unskilled workers: the North is home to both types of workers but the South
only has unskilled workers. When the North opens to trade, there are two channels
that operate to impact absolute wages and relative wages. First, there is the standard
Stolper-Samuelson effect: firms begin to substitute imported intermediates for unskilled
labor, which reduces the relative demand for unskilled labor. The novel mechanism is
the technology channel; the reduction in the cost of production brought about by the
substitution of low-skilled intermediates for low-skilled labor makes additional invest-
ment in new varieties possible. She shows that this technology channel dominates the
Stolper-Samuelson effect and, in the calibrated version of the model, the wages of both
types of workers rise. However, the wage of the skilled worker increases by more than
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the wage of unskilled worker, so the skill premium rises. Notably, because she does not
include a skilled worker in the South, the model cannot address the observation from
the data that skill premia rise in both countries.
A number of authors have postulated that perhaps skill-biased technical change is
transmitted across boarders via trade in capital equipment. Two such papers are those
by Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2013) andParro (2013). Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel
(2013) embed the production function developed by KORV into an Eaton and Kortum
(2002) framework in order to explore the impact of capital-skill complementarity and
trade upon the skill-intensity of production and, hence, the skill premium. In an open
economy model, the aggregate stock of capital equipment depends on domestic and
foreign productivities and labor endowments, as well as all pair-wise tariff rates or
trade costs. Changing trade costs only impacts the stock of capital equipment through
changes in the share of sectoral absorption that is produced domestically; if the share
of a particular sectoral output that is produced domestically falls, the stock of capital
equipment dedicated to that sector will also fall. They provide analytical expressions for
the relationships between the steady state values of (i) the skill premium, (ii) real wages
of skilled workers, and (iii) the real wages of unskilled workers to domestic expenditure
shares, productivities, and endowments. Next, they calibrate their model in order to
quantify the impact of trade and capital-skill complementarity upon the skill premium
in the world economy. They find that moving from autarky to a free trade equilibrium
benefits all workers, but skilled workers benefit disproportionately. They quantify these
effects for a large number of countries and do sensitivity analysis on key parameters.
Parro (2013) builds a very similar model in order to answer similar questions. The
two papers differ in two important ways. First, Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2013)
include the analytical expressions for the impact of trade liberalization on the outcomes
of interest. This allows them to make clear the impact of various parameters upon their
results, which is useful given that there is not strong agreement amongst economists
about the values for a number of key parameters. Second, the counterfactuals that
they conduct are different. Instead of studying the extreme cases of autarky to free
trade, Parro feeds in the measured changes in trade costs and technologies. This allows
him to assess the quantitative impact of these measured changes upon the measured
changes in the skill premium, whereas the exercise in Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel
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(2013) assesses the total possible impact of the proposed channel. They find that while
trade in capital equipment produces some changes in the skill premium, it is unable
to match some of the extreme changes in the skill premium that are observed in the
data. For example, Parro finds that the reduction in trade costs accounts for about one
third of the total change in the skill premium in the median developing country in his
sample. Both papers find that a reduction in trade costs is welfare improving, though
it disproportionately benefits skilled workers.
1.2.4 Labor Market Frictions and Bargaining
A number of papers have embedded search and matching frictions into trade models in
order to assess how labor markets react to free trade. A pioneering work on this front
is Davidson, Martin, and Matusz (1999) who embed search frictions and unemployment
into a standard trade model. They show that the normal predictions arising from
trade models do not extend to an environment with labor market frictions. Notably,
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem fails to hold in this environment when it is stated as
pertaining to all employed factors in the environment. Instead, it holds when it is a
statement about expected lifetime income of searching factors. A detailed reference for
the effects of search-frictions on labor market outcomes in models of trade is Davidson
and Matusz (2009).
A more recent and highly impactful study which includes these types of frictions
is Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010). They embed search frictions, bargaining
between workers and firms, idiosyncratic match quality, and employer testing to identify
the most productive workers in to a model with heterogeneous firms. Workers search
and find an employer with some probability that depends on the ratio of vacancies
to workers that are searching. Workers have an idiosyncratic match quality with any
given employer and firms have incentive to only employ the best matches because bad
matches can result in a reduction of the firm’s output. Therefore, firms test workers to
find out the quality of the match and only hire those workers whose match quality is
very high; other workers will remain unemployed. The most productive firms have the
highest threshold for match quality. Once a firm and worker are matched and the worker
is determined to be of sufficiently high quality, the two parties bargain over the wage
that the worker will receive. Because the surplus between a highly productive worker
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and a highly productive firm is high, the wage received by the worker in such a match
will receive a higher wage than one in a less productive match. Trade impacts wages
and unemployment through a reallocation channel: the most productive firms expand in
response to trade liberalization because they now are able to produce for export and the
least productive firms exit due to increased pressure from imports (productive foreign
firms provide competition). Therefore, the lease productive workers, which are the
lowest wage workers, are more likely to be unemployed in the free trade equilibrium than
in the autarkic one. Moreover, the wage that lower productivity workers receive is lower
since the incentive to screen at the marginal surviving firm is decreased by the decreased
volume of sales. This results in inequality increasing between the most productive and
least productive employed workers, as well as between the most productive workers and
those that are unemployed and receiving zero wages.
Mitra and Ranjan (2007) also include search frictions into a two-sector model of
offshoring in which workers are mobile between sectors. Their main focus is the impact
of globalization upon employment, both at the sectoral and the economy levels. They
find that offshoring can actually reduce unemployment in the domestic economy because
offshoring allows for domestic workers to benefit from efficiency gains. The reasoning
is similar to that in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), but in this case, the effi-
ciency gains that are created induce domestic firms to increase the rate at which they
post vacancies. As in any search model, the equilibrium unemployment rate is deter-
mined by the ratio of searching unemployed workers to the vacancies, so increasing the
rate at which vacancies are posted necessarily decreases the equilibrium unemployment.
Moreover, they find that wages for employed workers rise as a result of globalization.
If workers are not fully mobile across sectors, these results can be reversed because of
general equilibrium effects. In particular, there is a negative price effect in the sector
that offshores, which counteracts the incentive for firms to post new vacancies. Because
workers are no longer able to move between sectors, this increase in unemployment in
the offshoring sector can results in increased unemployment overall.
The predictions that arise from embedding search frictions into models of trade or
offshoring are therefore mixed with regards to the impact that these forces have on
wages, inequality, and unemployment. Although these models do not deal with the
business cycle frequency directly, they are those that most closely study the impact
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of globalization on employment, which may make them useful for studying how labor
markets recover from recessions and how these recoveries have changed over time.
1.2.5 Consumer Effects
The next theoretical contribution that I will discuss departs substantially from the
preceding literature in that it focuses on the consumer-side effects of trade on income
inequality. Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) build a two-country, two-sector
model, where one sector is competitive and produces a homogeneous good and the
other is monopolistically-competitive which produces goods that are both horizontally
differentiated (different types of goods) and vertically differentiated (different qualities
of goods). The only factor of production is labor. Workers draw their productivities
from an exogenous distribution and have preferences that are non-homothetic. This
makes it such that (i) workers will differ in terms of their income and (ii) workers of
different incomes will choose bundles of good that are different. Specifically, workers
with higher incomes will choose a bundle that is of higher quality than a lower income
worker’s bundle. When the two countries open to trade, the number of goods available
to each consumer changes, as in standard models with monopolistically-competitive
firms, and the quality composition of the goods will be affected. The exact effects on
quality composition depend heavily on existing income inequality. They study a special
case with two almost identical countries, except that one has workers that are more
productive on average. In this case, if the cost of transporting high-quality goods falls,
this changes welfare in two ways. First, the number of high-quality firms increases in
response to a lower marginal cost of production (since transportation costs fell). This,
in turn, pulls resources away from the production of low-quality goods, which therefore
reduces product diversity for low-income consumers. There is no effect on the income
distribution in terms of the numeraire good, but decreased transportation costs can
have large effects on the distribution of real incomes. This is novel since in almost
all other works, the effects of trade are felt through movements in factor markets and,
in this work, the effects are transmitted via the composition of consumption bundles.
This is appealing because, observationally, consumers with different incomes do, indeed,
consume very different bundles of goods. This line of research is, therefore, potentially
quite important to understanding the welfare implications of globalization.
18
1.2.6 Summary of Theoretical Contributions
When international goods and capital markets began to liberalize, the leading theories
for how this would impact labor markets was based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Therefore, it was difficult to rationalize how inequality could rise in most countries
and to conceive of how North-North trade to generate any impact on inequality. The
theories outlined above give frameworks in which these outcomes are possible and ra-
tionalizable. Trade in tasks, investment in capital equipment, and quality upgrading
all can contribute to rising skill premia and unemployment of low-skill workers even in
skill-scarce countries. Models that incorporate investment in new technologies or inno-
vation provide a framework in which North-North trade may result in rising inequality
in both countries. However, special cases of these theories also provide instances in
which advanced countries can experience falling inequality as a result of productivity
gains resulting from trade or offshoring. Therefore, it still remains for many of these
theories to be tested against the data in an attempt to quantify the importance of the
proposed mechanisms. Moreover, further exploration of the data may be necessary to
look for evidence of the proposed mechanisms.
1.3 Empirical Studies
A number of empirical studies have examined the impact of globalization on labor
markets, in terms of both wages and employment. There is a large literature that tests
the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory for the impact of inequality on trade.
Excellent surveys of this literature can be found in Feenstra and Hanson (2001) and
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). Much of the early work in this literature was focused on
trying to determine whether wage inequality increased due to globalization or skill biased
technical change and the findings were mixed. The innovations to theory described
in the preceding section were developed, in part, to address the findings of the early
literature. Here, I will focus on the papers that test the assumptions and implications
of the theories described in Section 2.
19
1.3.1 Comparative Advantage and Trade in Tasks
Feenstra and Hanson contributed greatly to the empirical literature on the impact of
trade in tasks or intermediates on the skill premium. In Feenstra and Hanson (1996b),
they argue that the ability to import intermediate inputs affects the relative demand
for skilled labor in the United States by allowing U.S. firms to move non-skill-intensive
activities overseas. This, in turn, shifts employment towards more skilled workers within
a particular industry. They explore this hypothesis using the NBER trade database
and the Census of Manufacturers for the years 1972-1990 and find that outsourcing
(the use of imported intermediate goods) can account for between 31 and 51 percent
of the increase in the relative demand for skills that occurred in the manufacturing
sector in the U.S. over the time period of interest. The main innovation of their papers
is the recognition that outsourcing may shift resources within industries, instead of
across them. In Feenstra and Hanson (1999), the authors try to disentangle the relative
importance of trade versus technology for the increase in the skill premium. They
again use imports of intermediate goods as a measure for offshoring and expenditures
on high-tech equipment as a measure of technological investment and they find that
both variables are important determinants of the change in skill-intensity for different
sectors, as well as the change in the ratio of non-production to production wages in
manufacturing. They use a two-step procedure to identify the impact of offshoring and
high-tech investments on prices and productivity and then to use the induced prices
and productivity to calculate changes in both production and non-production wages.
In Feenstra and Hanson (1997a), the authors turn their attention to the effects of U.S.
offshoring on wages in the Mexican manufacturing sector. They use data on the activities
of foreign-owned assembly plants (maquiladoras) to measure inflows of FDI or offshoring
to Mexico and examine the impact of the increase in this activity upon overall wages
in the Mexican manufacturing sector. They find that the increase in outsourcing by
foreign multinationals is correlated with a shift in production towards relatively skill-
intensive goods, which causes an increase in the relative demand for labor. They use
differential changes in FDI across regions to show that in those regions in which FDI was
the most concentrated, growth in FDI can account for over 50 percent of the increase
in the skilled labor share of total wages that occurred in the late 1980s.
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Amiti and Wei (2009) adapt the approach taken by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) so
that they can measure the impact of both material and service offshoring on productivity
growth in the United States. The employ data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the years 1992-2000 and find that both materials and service offshoring have a
statistically significant positive impact on domestic productivity growth; they estimate
that materials offshoring has a smaller impact, accounting for about 5 percent of average
growth in domestic productivity, and service offshoring has a somewhat larger impact,
accounting for about 10 percent of average productivity growth. Moreover, the impact
of materials offshoring is not statistically significant under all specifications of their
econometric model.
Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2009b) take seriously the idea that
different tasks are traded and measure a task by an occupation’s routineness. They hy-
pothesize, as do Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), that more routine tasks might
be easier to offshore. Moreover, in their econometric specification, they control for
the change in computerization rates for different occupations in order to disentagle off-
shoring from technology substituting for low skilled labor. Autor, Levy, and Murnane
(2003) show that occupations that are more routine can be more easily performed by
computers and, therefore, workers who perform these jobs are more easily replaced by
computers. Therefore, Ebenstein et al wish to control for this effect in their empirical
exercises. Furthermore, this specification allows them to consider how specific occupa-
tions, as opposed to industries, are impacted by offshoring. This differs from the extant
literature in an important way. Various studies have shown that the cross-industry shifts
predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory do not seem to hold in the data; this has led
researchers to conclude that the shift in relative wages observed in the data could not be
attributable to trade. It may be easier for workers to change industries than for them to
change occupations. If this is the case, an approach that focuses on changes in industry
premia may be missing the main effect of workers changing industries, but maintaining
their occupation. They find that, indeed, offshoring has had substantial effects at the
occupation-level specifically through displacing workers and inducing them to take jobs
in other, lower-paying, industries. They find that occupation-specific changes in off-
shoring and trade are associated with significant wage effects, especially for workers in
routine occupations. They also find that the location of offshoring is important for the
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sign of the effects: A 1 percent increase in offshore activity in low-income countries is
associated with a 0.11 percent decrease in wages, whereas a 1 percent increase in offshore
activity in high-income countries is associated with a 0.1 increase in domestic wages.
Import and export penetration have larger effects but these effects are only statistically
significant in some specifications. The authors find that the net impact of offshoring
on wages is a function of the extent to which the occupation is routine; they find that
the net effect of offshoring on wages is negative for the most routine occupations and
positive for the least routine.
1.3.2 Modifications to the Eaton-Kortum Model of Trade
The use of models with a large number of varieties of goods, as in Burstein and Vogel
(2012), has implications that are consistent with a number of well-documented outcomes
in the data. In particular, these types of models help to replicate the existence of North-
North trade, as well as the lack of factor-price equalization and the existence of high
variance of goods prices across locations in which they are sold. Embedding two types
of labor into this framework allows the authors to match some other key observations in
the data that were previously believed to be inconsistent with trade having an impact
on inequality. First, as documented in Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), opening to trade
is accompanied by a drop in the relative price of skill-intensive sectors. Heckscher-Ohlin
would predict that, in order for trade to have a positive impact on the skill premium in
a skill-abundant country, the relative price of goods in the skill-intensive sector should
fall. Second, most factor reallocation resulting from increased trade happens within,
rather than across, sectors, as documented in Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994).
Third, as summarized by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), inequality rises following trade
liberalization for a number of skill-scarce countries. Therefore, embedding two types
of labor, with a productive technology that augments one type of labor more than the
other, into an EK model is both supported by the data and helps to resolve some of the
puzzles that have been documented.
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013a) document the differential impact of import com-
petition that is captured by Kondo (2012). They combine data on wages, employment,
and labor force participation by commuting zones from the Census with data on im-
ports of goods from China from the United Nation’s Comtrade database in order to
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explore the varying impact of imports on different regions within the U.S. They hy-
pothesize that those regions in which the economy is most concentrated in producing
goods whose imports have risen most substantially will be those that have the most
visible labor effects as a result of increasing trade with China. In order to control for
potential endogeneity of Chinese imports in to any given region in the U.S., they instru-
ment for the shock of increasing Chinese imports into the U.S. using Chinese imports
into other developed countries. They find that Chinese imports have strong and sig-
nificant effects on wages, employment, and labor force participation, with the largest
effects being on non-participation. In the most conservative case, they find that the
measured increase in Chinese imports accounts for one-quarter of the rise in unemploy-
ment in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1990 to 2007. Moreover, they find that
the increase in Chinese imports is positively associated with pushing workers towards
claiming disability.
1.3.3 Trade and Innovation
Several studies have focused upon the interaction between trade and innovation, as well
as the interaction between trade and investment in new technologies or capital. Bloom,
Draca, and Reenen (2011) examine the impact of Chinese import competition upon both
types of activities using a panel of firms from 12 European Union countries from 1996
to 2007. They specifically examine the impact of import competition upon research and
development, patenting activities, investment in information technology (IT), and on
firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) over the time period of interest. They propose
several different methods to deal with potential endogeneity between technology shocks
and increasing imports from China; their preferred method is to use China’s entry into
the World Trade Organization as an exogenous shock. They find that there are two main
effects of increased import competition. First, they find that this increase is associated
with increases in all of the examined activities within firms. Secondly, there is evidence
of reallocation of employment between firms from less innovative to more innovative and
technologically advanced firms. These two effects are roughly equal in magnitude and
together can account for about 15 percent of European technology upgrading over the
latter half of the sample (2000-2006). They also find that overall employment, profits,
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prices, and skill share decrease as import competition from China increases. They com-
pare these results to what happens when import competition from advanced countries
increases and find that, in contrast, this type of increase in competition has no effect.
This paper provides support both for the idea that innovation is increased (increased
investment in research in development and patenting activities) and that investment in
existing technologies increases (increased investment in information technology).
Quality Upgrading
In addition to making a theoretical contribution, Verhoogen (2008) also provides strong
empirical evidence for his proposed mechanism. He uses a panel of Mexican plants,
combining data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (Encuesta Industrial Anual)
with data from the National Survey of Employment, Wages, Technology, and Training
(Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnolo´ıa, y Capacitac´ıon). The two surveys
include information on wages, employment, investment, and a measure of product qual-
ity, called the ISO 900 certification. This certification is an international production
standard and is viewed by Mexican managers as a signal of a high-quality product.
Verhoogen uses it as a indicator variable to identify those plants which are producing
a high quality product; changes in ISO 900 certification status indicate changes in the
quality of goods produced at a given plant. He uses the peso devaluation that occurred
in 1994 as an exogenous source of variation to show that initially more productive plants
increase their export share of sales, wages of both white- and blue-collar workers, the
relative wages of white-collar workers, and the fraction of goods that are ISO 900 cer-
tified by more than initially less productive plants during the peso crisis. Moreover,
these variables change by more during the peso crisis than during other periods in the
sample. This supports the idea that quality upgrading induced by the exchange rate
shock increases within industry inequality. Recall that Verhoogen’s interest is across-
plant, or within-industry, inequality and not inequality across workers. His empirical
work provides support for his hypothesis that variation in plant outcomes is connected
to increased access to foreign markets.
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Investment in Skill-Augmenting Capital
Caselli (2013) explores the interaction between investment in capital machinery and
equipment (M&E) and the skill premium in Mexico in support of the hypothesis that
technological change can be embodied in capital equipment. He uses the price of M&E
as a proxy for skill-biased technical change, as was done in KORV, with the idea that the
falling price of M&E is due to technological change. He uses a panel from the Mexican
Anual Survey of Manufacturers in order to link changes in the skill premium to changes
in M&E, controlling for a number of variables. He shows that increases in foreign direct
investment and M&E are both associated with increases in the skill premium at the
plant level and that tariffs on M&E are negatively correlated with the skill premium.
Moreover, the price of M&E in Mexico is determined predominantly by the price of
M&E in the United State and tariffs on the import of M&E. These results indicate that
technology may be transferred across borders via trade in machinery and equipment.
The estimated magnitudes of the impact of imports of M&E are relatively small, but
the results are statistically significant.
1.3.4 Labor Market Frictions and Bargaining
Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2012) provide support for the proposed
theory in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) using linked employer-employee data
from Brazil. They show, first, that much of the measured wage inequality occurs within
sectors and occupations, as opposed to across them. Moreover, a large share of inequal-
ity is driven by inequality between firms, as opposed to within firms. They argue that
much of the inequality that they measure is residual inequality; that is, it remains even
after controlling for worker characteristics. They find a strong relationship between
firm-level inequality and exporter status of the firm; exporters, on average, pay higher
wages to all employees than their non-exporting counterparts. Furthermore, exporters
on average are much larger than non-exporters in terms of both output and employment.
This matches what is documented by Bernard and Jensen (1997) for the United States.
The authors then use their data to calibrate a modified version of the model presented
in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) and show that the calibrated version of this
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modified model is consistent with the documented facts from the data. Using the cali-
brated model, they are able to show that the exporter wage premium depends on both
the selection into exporting of the most productive firms that pay higher wages and
the increase in firm wages which comes about because of the greater market access of
exporters.
Cosar (2013) documents further evidence of labor market frictions and their impor-
tance for labor market adjustment to trade liberalization. He shows that labor markets
typically exhibit slow reallocation of labor across industries, with large costs for dis-
placed workers and even larger costs of adjustment for the oldest workers. He presents
a calibrated overlapping generations model with frictional labor markets and sector-
specific human capital. In the context of this model, he is able to show that labor
market frictions are not sufficient to explain the sluggishness of adjustment. Instead,
sector-specific human capital is necessary to match the documented facts. Together,
these two features of the model are able to replicate the patterns observed in the data.
The model presented and estimated in Dix-Carneiro (2013) is similar to that in
Cosar (2013). His model features overlapping generations and two sectors, with the
accumulation of sector-specific human capital which leads to switches between sectors
being costly. In addition to choosing a sector in which to work, workers can choose not
to be employed. He also uses the matched employer-employee data from Brazil in order
to estimate the model. He estimates that, in this data, workers incur costs equal to 1.4
to 2.7 times individual annual average wages in order to switch sectors. However, these
estimates vary dramatically across individuals with different observable characteristics.
This leads to large dispersion in inter-sectoral mobility, which implies differing ability
to adjust to demand shifts associated with trade liberalizations. This paper is among
the first to estimate the actual cost associated with reallocation of labor across sectors
or occupations. It provides direct evidence that labor market frictions may play an
important role in the response of an economy to a trade liberalization.
1.4 Conclusion
Contrary to findings in the early 1990s, recent modifications to traditional trade theory
have shown that globalization may have important impacts on labor market outcomes.
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The modifications that have been made to existing theory allow for trade to impact labor
markets through a number of new channels, including inducing firms to make additional
investments in technologies. This channel seems to be an important one, both for the
development of new technologies and for the proliferation of these new technologies
across countries. In this sense, it’s possible that the two competing hypothesis for
growing inequality and low-skill unemployment, namely globalization and technological
change, could actually be complementary hypothesis, mutually reinforcing one another.
This line of research deserves more theoretically and empirical attention, as these two
trends seem to go hand-in-hand in a number of cases. The literature concerning the
changing nature of labor market responses to business cycles has yet to focus much on
the role of globalization and trade. Given the growing literature that shows the impact
of these forces on longer-run labor market trends, it stands to reason that they could
have important implications for cyclical elements of labor markets.
Chapter 2
Globalization and the Changing
Shape of Labor Recoveries
2.1 Introduction
In the post-war era, the labor market typically begins to recover one to two quarters
after GDP begins to recover. Moreover, once this growth begins, it tends to be strong.
However, in the three most recent recessions, labor markets have seen recoveries that
have been both slow and weak relative to previous recoveries, earning them the moniker
“jobless recoveries.” Even when one accounts for the fact that GDP growth has been
slower in these recoveries than in earlier ones, the sluggishness of the labor recoveries is
remarkable. Much attention has been paid to this change in the business cycle features
of labor markets. However, less attention has been paid to the secular changes that have
occurred over the same period. In particular, the employment to population ratio has
been falling since its 2001 peak and is currently at a level that has not been seen since
the early 1980’s, having fallen about 6 percentage points, from a peak of about 64% to
its current level, 58%. In all previous business cycles, the employment to population
recovered to its pre-recession peak. In fact, it has consistently risen since the early
1970’s, when women began to join the workforce en mass.
The uncharacteristically high and persistent unemployment rate that has followed
the Great Recession has renewed interest in the jobless recovery phenomenon. In par-
ticular, many have wondered what has made the recovery following the Great Recession
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so different from the one in the early 1980’s. In this paper, I argue that jobless re-
coveries are related to trend growth in emerging markets and international opening. I
have in mind that these emerging markets offer companies opportunities for expansion
but costly reallocation assures that they wait until the potential benefit of reallocation
outweighs the costs. Recessions provide such an opportunity since lower productivity
in the advanced country makes the cost of reallocating resources relatively lower in a
recessionary period. I offer evidence that this reallocation is occurring over the time
period in which jobless recoveries have emerged. Moreover, I show that labor market
outcomes can be tied to increasing globalization.
In order to explore my hypothesis further, I build a modified growth model. In
the model, a multinational cooperation chooses either to produce in an advanced, high
productivity country which is not growing or in an emerging, lower productivity country
whose productivity is growing. The multinational produces a final consumption good
using labor and managerial services 1 which are produced in the advanced economy
but can be reallocated and used for production in the emerging economy. There are
two forces operating in the model. The first is the relative growth of the emerging
country. This leads to the secular shift of managerial services and, thus, production
to the emerging market. The second is the mechanism which slows this secular shift
and assures that it occurs primarily during recessions: a cost of adjusting the use of
managerial services in each country. This is what causes the shift in production to occur
primarily during recessions and leads to the emergence of jobless recoveries. Essentially,
recessions are “cheap” times to reallocate resources across countries.
I show that falling production of the consumption good in the advanced economy
does not coincide with falling GDP. Thus, with no adjustment costs, the model produces
increasing GDP and falling labor and labor productivity rises as factors are reallocated.
With adjustment costs, recessions are a time when the firm is willing to pay to adjust,
shifting resources to the more efficient production location. Therefore, the model pro-
duces large and sustained drops in labor in the advanced economy following a recession,
while GDP recovers as the emerging market grows. Thus, the model is able to produce
a jobless recovery.
1Similar to those proposed by Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2007)
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Additionally, the model is consistent with increasing income inequality across indi-
viduals in the advanced economy. This is due, in part, to a decrease in labor demand for
the low-skilled households in the economy. It is also because labor by the high-skilled
households become relatively more valuable as productivity in the emerging market
grows.
The results suggest that the mechanism that I propose shows potential to be able to
account for both the secular trends and the business cycle anomalies that have arisen
in the past 20 to 25 years. In future work, I will calibrate the model in order to assess
what share of job losses can be accounted for by the proposed mechanism.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is most closely related to the recent work of Jaimovich and Siu (2012). They
hypothesize that jobless recoveries can be tied to the recent reduction in routine jobs in
the economy and increased concentration of employment in the tails of the occupational
skills distribution. They show that the vast majority of the shift in the occupational
distribution occurs around and during the three recessions and recoveries are jobless.
Following the literature on job polarization, 2 they attribute the drop in employment in
jobs that predominately rely on routine skills to technological change which is skill- or
routine-biased. I propose a different mechanism for the shift in the labor composition of
employment. As has been recognized in several empirical studies, 3 routine jobs are also
those that can be easily offshored. I see my work as complementary to that of Jaimovich
and Siu, who recognize that there is a role for offshoring and outsourcing in the job
polarization literature, but fail to explore it. Moreover, they fail to provide evidence for
the mechanism they do explore. In this paper, I show that increased import competition
is associated with decreased job creation, suggesting that international forces should be
important in accounting for both trend and cycle declines in employment.
My paper is further related to two strands of literature. The first is a growing
literature that explores the jobless recovery phenomenon. Bachmann (2011) offers an
increase in labor hoarding as an explanation for jobless recoveries. According to this
theory, when firms retain redundant works during downturns, hiring is weak during the
2Autor (2010), Autor et al (2006), and Goos et al (2009)
3See, for example, Ebenstein et al (2009), Goos et al (2009), and Liu and Trefler (2011)
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subsequent recovery. This theory implies, counter factually, that the recent recoveries
should be associated with increasingly procyclical labor productivity. Relatedly, Berger
(2012) builds a model in which firms use recessions as opportunities to streamline their
workforce. He argues that firms are more able to do this in the recent past due to
the decline of union power. While Berger is able to generate weak labor recoveries
and acyclical labor productivity, his paper suggest, counter factually, that the pattern
of joblessness arises from increased job destruction rates. The data show that, while
job losses certainly increase around recessions, jobless recoveries are related to low job
creation rates. He relies on firms growing “fat” in good times, or booms, and shedding
some of the inefficiencies during recessions. The mechanism that I propose is able to
generate acyclical labor productivity and weak job creation after recessions. Pries and
Sims (2011) present a theory in which the Great Moderation and jobless recoveries are
related. They hypothesize that reallocation shocks are have become relatively more
important than aggregate shocks. Therefore, recent recoveries have been marked times
of reallocation. They are able to replicate the qualitative changes in business cycles, but
they do not offer an explanation as to why reallocation shocks have grown in importance.
My work is complementary to theirs in that it offers a more micro-founded explanation
of this phenomenon.
The second of strand of literature to which this paper contributes is the theoretical
literature on job market impacts of increasing trade and international competition.
I draw upon the observations of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2011). They show that
increased competition from China, in the form of imported goods, can account for a
large portion of the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment. Rising import exposure
increases unemployment and lowers labor force participation. They concentrate on am
empirical exploration of the downward trend from 1990 to 2007, while I offer a reason
that this trend exists, as well as tie the trend to jobless recoveries. In a related paper,
Kondo (2013) uses an alternate measure of import competition, finding larger impacts on
the broader labor market, not just the market for manufacturing employees. He finds
that, in addition to reducing unemployment and labor force participation, increased
import competition is associated with lower job creation rates and high job destruction
rates. To my knowledge, I am the first to consider the business cycle effects of increased
globalization on labor markets.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical evidence
for the existence of jobless recoveries as part of a larger downward trend in employment
relative to population. It then provides a link between this observation and increased
globalization. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 provides a simplification of
the model and illustrates the impacts of increased growth in low-income countries on
advanced countries. In Section 5, I conduct a quantitative experiment to demonstrate
that the model produces jobless recoveries and, in Section 6, I discuss calibration and
steps for further research. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I first document the existence of jobless recoveries. I also offer some
evidence about how overall employment and the employment to population ratio have
been impacted by the drastic fall in manufacturing employment. I then turn to evidence
of increased productivity in emerging markets and their relative importance in the global
economy. Finally, I show some evidence that these two sets of facts are related.
2.2.1 Labor Market Data
In Figure 2.1, I plot total non-farm employees from the Establishment Survey from
1960 to 2012. The figure displays log deviations from a linear trend. Notably, after
the two most recent recessions, employment has not recovered to its pre-recession peak.
Additionally, in the recovery after the 1991 recession, employment recovered at a much
slower rate than is exhibited in the previous recessions.
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Figure 2.1: Deviations from Linear Trend
This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2.2. Table 1 shows the length (in months) of
recovery from three early post-war and the three most recent recessions. It is measured
in months from the trough of the business cycle, as dated by the NBER. So, in each of
these recoveries, GDP began to recover in zero months. The first row shows a marked
increase in the number of months it takes for growth in employment markets to begin.
The second row reiterates the point, showing that labor markets take even longer to
return to the level that they were at when GDP hit its trough. Note that the second
row does not count the number of months it takes for employment to reach its cyclical
peak. Rather, it counts the number of months it takes for employment to rebound to a
level that it was at when GDP began to exhibit positive growth.
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Figure 2.2: Employment relative to Trough
Early Recent
Months to: 1970 1975 1982 1991 2001 2007
Turn-around 1 2 1 18 23 15
Return to Trough 2 2 4 15 55 21
Table 2.1: Measures of Recovery
As Figure 2.3 shows, the employment to population ratio has not recovered from
its 2001 pre-recession peak. Much of the fall in employment (and therefore, the em-
ployment to population ratio) can be attributed to a substantial drop in manufacturing
employment. From 2001 to 2011, manufacturing employment fell from about 17 million
employees to just under 12 million. (See Figure 2.4). Figures 2.5 and 2.6 highlight the
importance of the decrease in employment in manufacturing. In these counterfactuals,
I set manufacturing employment to it’s 1991 level (18 million employees) from 1991 to
2012. In each figure, the blue line is the data and the red line is the counter factual
experiment. In all three of the most recent recoveries, employment growth would have
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been much faster had manufacturing employment not dropped so severely. Moreover,
the employment to population ratio would have recovered after the 2001 recession and
would currently be about four percentage points higher than it is in the data. Obviously,
this is not an entirely clean exercise, as some of the workers who lost their manufac-
turing jobs have found jobs in other sectors of the economy. However, it does serve to
illustrate the importance of the decline in manufacturing activity in the U.S.
Figure 2.3: Employment to Population Ratio
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Figure 2.4: Manufacturing Employees
Figure 2.5: Counterfactual: Employees
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Figure 2.6: Counterfactural: EmpPop
2.2.2 Emerging Market Data
In this section, I present evidence of the growing importance of emerging markets. First,
I show evidence that these countries are “catching up” to their advanced counterparts,
in terms of share of world GDP. I then provide evidence that the U.S. economy is more
exposed to this competition, both through increased trade and through offshoring oppor-
tunities. In particular, U.S. companies (multinationals) have responded by expanding
more heavily in developing countries than developed ones.
Figure 2.7 shows the share of GDP accounted for by advanced versus non-advanced
countries. The data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
I hold the set of advanced countries fixed over the entire time period. It is notable that
in 2000, the share of world GDP accounted for by non-advanced countries began to
grow. By 2011, the share of world GDP accounted for by non-advanced countries was
almost equal to that of the advanced countries. Most of this shift can be attributed
to the emergence of China and its spectacular growth after it joined the World Trade
organization in late 2002.
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Figure 2.7: Share of per capita World GDP
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the trends in multinational employment. In Figure 2.8, I
plot the log of the number of employees of U.S.-based multinational companies employed
in the U.S., in other advanced countries, and in developing countries.4 Figure 2.9
normalizes the number of employees in 1990 to 100 in order to show the growth in
employment in the three areas. Total employment in multinationals has grown over time,
but domestic growth has been almost flat. Similarly, employment in other advanced
economies has grown, but only by about 20% over two decades. Employment in emerging
markets, on the other hand, has surged, growing by about 280% over the same period.
The share of employees in emerging markets began to grow particularly quickly in 2002,
as manufacturing employment in the U.S. began to fall off substantially.
4Data from the BEA’s Direct Investment and Multinational Companies (MNCs) database
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Figure 2.8: Log Employees
Figure 2.9: Log Employees relative to 1990
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I turn now to imports from developing countries. It has been documented elsewhere5
that in 1991 the low-income country share of U.S. manufacturing imports only accounted
for 2.9% of U.S. manufacturing imports. In 2007, they accounted for 11.7%. Imports
from China account for over 90% of the total growth in low-income country imports.
Moreover, total U.S. spending on Chinese goods grew by almost 700% over the same
period.
Figure 2.10 shows the U.S. trade balance. Clearly, during the period in which we
observe a secular drop in manufacturing employment is a period of increased trade and
competition. Figure 2.11 reiterates that much of this growth in trade can be accounted
for by growth in trade with low-income countries.
Figure 2.10: U.S. Trade Balance
5See, for example, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2011)
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Figure 2.11: U.S. Imports of Intermediate Goods
2.2.3 Increased Globalization and Labor Market Outcomes
Here, I offer evidence that the trend and cyclical changes in labor market outcomes are
related to increased globalization and competition from low-income countries. Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson (2011) find that about one quarter of the secular drop in manu-
facturing employment can be accounted for by increased import competition. In a
complementary paper, Kondo (2013) extends their work using a different measure of
import competition. Furthermore, he considers additional labor market variables, in-
cluding job creation and destruction. In what follows, I replicate the results in Kondo
(2013).
As a measure of import competition, I workers who have been certified to receive
Federal TAA (Trade Adjustment Assistance) benefits, as a fraction of working age pop-
ulation. There is substantial variety in this measure across state and years which can
be exploited to identify differences in employment rates and job creation and destruc-
tion rates. I calculate employment status and weeks unemployed from the Current
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Population Survey. Job destruction and creation rates are constructed using the Busi-
ness Dynamics Statistics database and the definitions of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1998). Table 2 reports the results of the following regression:
dependent variableit = α + β x import competition
i
t + γ x controls
i
t + error
i
t
These regressions show that increased import competition is associated with lower
rates of employment and labor force participation, high job destruction, and lower job
creation. Higher destruction rates and lower creation rates clearly lead to a secular
decrease in employment. Moreover, the results show that increased import competition
results in longer unemployment spells. Therefore, we can say that these results support
that hypothesis.
Dependent Variable Import Competition R2 N
Not Employed
3.35∗ 0.86 1350
(0.78)
Not in Labor Force
2.19∗ 0.86 1350
(0.86)
Weeks Unemployed
.51∗ 0.54 1350
(0.15)
Job Destruction Rate
1.82∗ 0.80 1350
(0.72)
Job Creation Rate
-1.276∗ 0.77 1350
(0.63)
Table 2.2: Labor Market Outcomes and Import Competition
There is clearly an endogeneity issue in the regressions above since the measure
of import competition being used is essentially a measure of unemployment insurance.
Therefore, in future work, I will exploit the method of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2011)
to instrument for import competition. Additionally, more work needs to be done to
relate import competition to business cycle frequency indicators. In particular, I am
exploring how months to recovery vary across states, recessions, and industries with
increased import competition.
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2.3 Model
In this section, I develop a modified growth model in which growth in an emerging
country can lead to jobless recoveries in the advanced country. I first describe the
problem solved by the firm (the multinational) and then the problem solved by the two
types of households.
2.3.1 The Environment
Time is discrete and infinite. There are two countries: Advanced (A) and Emerging (E).
In Country A, there are two types of households, whereas in Country E, there is only
one type of household. Each household consumes a single consumption good and saves
with a one-period bond. Households of type “M” operate a linear backyard technology
in order to produce managerial services, which they then rent to the firm. These services
can be used in either country but are produced only in Country A. Type-L households
live in both countries and rent labor services to the firm’s production facility in the
country where they reside. The proportion of type-M to type-L households in Country
A is fixed at α1−α . The single consumption good is produced by a multinational firm,
which is headquartered in Country A. This firm can choose production locations. It will
rent labor from the household that is located in the country of production. The two
countries differ in their productivities. Country A is more productive than Country E
at t = 0 but has zero growth, whereas Country E’s productivity grows deterministically
over time.
2.3.2 The Multinational
The multinational operating in Country i produces output (yit) at time t using labor
(lit) and managerial “know-how” or services (m
i
t)
yit = z
i
t(m
i
t)
θ(lit)
ν
where
θ + ν ≤ 1
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Managerial services are rented from M-type households in Country A and may be real-
located by the multinational across countries. Denote by mit the amount of managerial
services that are used in country i and by mt the total amount of managerial services
hired by the firm, which will be the sum of mAt and m
E
t . Notice that managerial services
are mobile across borders, but labor is not. The term zit is country-specific productivity.
The multinational will face productivity processes whose growth vary across countries.
In particular,
zA0 > z
E
0
zAt = z
A
0 , ∀t
zEt = ρ
tzE0 + (1− ρt)zA0
The multinational pays a local wage to laborers (wiL,t). The rent paid to managerial
services will be the same, no matter where the managerial services are used since they
are all produced in Country A. The multinational pays a fixed cost of adjusting the
level of managerial services in each country.
The multinational firm takes prices as given and maximizes the present value of
dividends:
max
mt,mAt ,m
E
t ,l
A
t ,l
E
t
∑
t
ptDt
subject to
Dt = d
A
t + d
E
t
dit = y
i
t − wiL,tlit − wM,tmt − ϕ1mit 6=mit−1
yit = z
i
t(m
i
t)
θ(lit)
ν
2.3.3 Households
There are two types of households in the advanced economy: L-type households and
M-type households. L-type households make up a fraction 1− α of the total economy,
where M-type households make up a fraction α. The emerging economy has only L-type
households.
In each period, t, the L-type household in country i receives labor income, wiL,tn
i
L,t,
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earnings on his asset position, (1 + rb,t)b
i
L,t, and some fraction φ
i
L of the total dividends
of the firm (Dt). He chooses consumption, c
i
L,t, labor supply, n
i
L,t, and asset position,
biL,t+1. The maximization problem for the household is thus
max
ciL,t,n
i
L,t,b
i
L,t+1
∑
t
βtu
(
ciL,t − v(niL,t)
)
subject to
pt(c
i
L,t + b
i
L,t+1) = pt
(
wiL,tn
i
L,t + (1 + rb,t)b
i
L,t + φ
i
LDt
)
The household take all prices (pt, w
i
L,t,rb,t) as given.
The M-type household has access to a backyard linear technology which he operates
in order to produce an intermediate good, “managerial services”, mt, which it sells
to the firm at price wM,t. Its income is thus composed of rental income, wm,tmt,
earnings of the asset position, (1 + rb,t)bM,t, and a fraction φM of the firm’s dividend
payments. It chooses consumption, cM,t, labor supply, nM,t, and asset position, bM,t+1.
The maximization problem for the household is thus
max
cM,t,nM,t,mt,bM,t+1
∑
t
βtu (cM,t − v(nM,t))
subject to
pt(cM,t + bM,t+1) = pt (wM,tnM,t + (1 + rb,t)bM,t + φMDt)
mt = nM,t
The household takes all prices (pt, wM,t,rb,t) as given.
2.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is prices {pt, rb,t, wiL,t, wM,t} and a set of quantities
{dit, yit,mt,mit, niL,t, ciL,t, cM,t, biL,t, bM,t}i∈{A,E} that are consistent with
1. the firm’s maximization problem,
2. the household maximization problems,
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3. managerial services market clearing,
mt = m
A
t +m
E
t
4. labor market clearing in each country i ,
lit = n
i
L,t
5. bond market clearing, ∑
i∈{A,E}
biL,t + bM,t = 0
6. the aggregate resource constraint
∑
i
ciL,t + cM,t =
∑
i
yit
2.4 Effects of Increasing Productivity in Country E: Sec-
ular Decrease in Labor
In this section, I explore the qualitative effects of an increase in the productivity of the emerging
market, relative to that of the advanced economy. I want to show that, under certain conditions,
growth in Country E causes labor in Country A to fall, while GDP in that country rises.
2.4.1 Simplified Model: Abstracting from Adjustment Costs
For the moment, let us abstract from adjustment costs in order to explore the impact of growth
in the developing country in a clear way. In this case, the firm is solving
max
mt,mAt ,m
E
t ,l
A
t ,l
E
t
∑
t
ptDt
subject to
Dt = d
A
t + d
E
t
dit = y
i
t − wiL,tlit − wM,tmt
yit = z
i
t(m
i
t)
θ(lit)
ν
Let’s further assume that the household has preferences that are linear in consumption and take
the form
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u(c− v(n)) = c− n
1+γ
1 + γ
Assuming that p0 = 1, the household’s problem yields first order equations
wiL,t = (n
i
L,t)
γ
wM,t = (nM,t)
γ
(1 + rb,t) =
1
β
pt = β
t
Assume that θ = 1− ν. Then, the firm’s problem yields first order conditions:
wAL,t = νz
A
t
(
mAt
nAt
)1−ν
wEL,t = νz
E
t
(
mEt
nEt
)1−ν
wM,t = (1− ν)zEt (mEt )−ν(nEt )ν
(1− ν)zEt (mEt )−ν(nEt )ν = (1− ν)zAt (mAt )−ν(nAt )ν
Substituting the equilibrium condition
mEt = mt −mAt
into the firm’s first order conditions and the household conditions yields two equations and two
unknowns which chacterize the equilibrium:
mAt =
(
zAt
zEt
) γ+1
γν (
mt −mAt
)
mt =
[
(1− ν)ν νγ−ν+1 (zAt )
γ+1
γ−ν+1
] 1
γ (
mAt
) −ν
γ−ν+1
I can then solve for mt and m
A
t in terms of fundamentals. First, denote
z˜ =
(
zAt
zEt
) γ+1
γν
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Then,
mAt =
(
z˜
1 + z˜
) γ−ν+1
γ+1 (
(1− ν)γ−ν+1 νν
) 1
γ(γ+1)
(zAt )
1
γ
mt =
(
z˜
1 + z˜
) ν
γ+1 (
(1− ν)γ−ν+1 νν
) 1
γ(γ+1)
(zAt )
1
γ
I would like to see whether there exists a set of parameters under which growth in the
developing country causes GDP in the advanced country to rise, while labor in that country
falls. Note that gross domestic product (GDPAt ) and aggregate labor (L
A
t ) can be written:
GDPAt = αwM,tmt + (1− α)wAL,tnAL,t
LAt = αnM,t + (1− α)nAL,t
Since wM,t = n
γ
M,t and w
A
L,t = (n
A
L,t)
γ , GDP can be re-written:
GDPAt = αm
γ+1
t + (1− α)(nAL,t)γ+1
I must, therefore, express nAt as a function of fundamentals.
nAt =
(
z˜
1 + z˜
) 1−ν
γ+1 (
(1− ν)1−ν ν (1−ν)ν+γ(1+γ)γ−ν+1
) 1
γ(γ+1)
(zAt )
1
γ
Plugging in for mt, m
A
t , and n
A
t , I can express GDP
A
t and L
A
t in terms of fundamentals.
GDPAt = (z
A
t )
1
γ
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−ν+γν
θ
(
(1− α)(1− ν) 1−νγ ν
ν−ν2+γ2+γ
(γ+γ2)θ
z˜
1 + z˜
(γ+1)
θ
+ α(1− ν) θγ ν νγ
)
LAt = (z
A
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γ+1
γ
z˜
1 + z˜
−ν
θ
(
(1− α)(1− ν) 1−νγ(γ+1) ν z˜
1 + z˜
1
θ
+ α(1− ν) θγ(γ+1) ν νγ(γ+1)
)
where
θ = γ − ν + 1
I want to examine what happens when zE grows but zA does not. In order to do this, I
take derivatives of GDPA and LA with respect to zE . In this environment, I get GDPA rising
while labor, LA, is falling if the following two inequalities are satisfied.
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Here, I’m assuming that ν ∈ [0, 1] and that γ > 0. These assumptions are innocuous given
the interpretation of these parameters. The parameter ν maps to labor’s share in the economy
and γ is the disutility of labor.
2.4.2 Quantitative Exercise
I now turn to a quantitative exercise in which the above conditions are satisfied and show that,
in the absence of adjustment costs, the model generates a trend decrease in labor, while GDP
continues to grow. Table2.3 reports the parameter values that were used in the quantitative
exercise.
Parameter Value Governs
ρ 0.95 Growth in Country E
β 0.96 Household Discouting
γ 2 Disutility of labor
θ 0.7 Service share
ν 0.3 Labor Share
α 0.5 Share of Managerial Households
ϕ 0 Fixed Cost of Adjustment
Table 2.3: Parameter Values
Figures 2.12,2.13, and 2.14 show the model predictions in a frictionless economy for the
above parameterization. Notice, in Figure 2.12, that GDP in the advanced economy grows,
even as total labor in that economy falls. Managerial services become more valuable as more
and more labor is used worldwide. In the background, productivity in the emerging country is
rising, increasing demand for both mEt and n
E
t . Since all managerial services are produced in the
advanced country, GDP rises as a result for increasing world demand for managerial services.
Figure 2.13 shows the change in equilibrium outcomes. Notice that mt is rising as n
A
t is falling.
Generating falling labor is essentially a horse race between these two forces. Mechanically, it
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must be the case that labor productivity is rising in this economy, since GDP is rising as labor
is falling. Figure 2.14 shows that this is, indeed, the case.
Figure 2.15 shows the trade balance generated by the model, as a percentage of model GDP
in country A. As in the data, the trade balance is falling as the emerging country grows. This
observation can later be used in order to guide a more serious calibration.
Figure 2.12: GDP and Labor
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Figure 2.13: Change in Inputs
Figure 2.14: Labor Productivity
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Figure 2.15: Trade Balance as Percent of GDP
In order for GDP to rise, it must be the case that total income in the economy is rising. It
must be that wages for the L-type household in the advanced economy are falling since wages
simply equal (nAt )
γ in equilibrium and that is falling. Therefore, the income of the low-skilled
household is falling in the model. Then, income for the high-skilled household must be rising in
order to generate overall growth in income in the economy. So, income dispersion increases as the
emerging country grows and the world demands more labor inputs from the high-skill household
and fewer labor inputs from the low-skilled household in the advanced country. Therefore, as
an added feature, the model generates rising income inequality.
2.5 Adding Adjustment Costs: Generating Jobless Recov-
eries
In this section, I allow for adjustment costs and explore whether the model can generate jobless
recoveries, or sustained losses in employment accompanied by growth in GDP, via a negative
productivity shock to zA. I return to the model developed in Section 3, which features an
adjustment cost that the firm must pay any time it changes mAt or m
E
t . Therefore, even though
Country E may be growing in the beginning, the firm may not want to pay the adjustment cost
until zE grows sufficiently or zA falls sufficiently. It is well known that non-convex adjustment
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costs generate this zone of inactivity.
Parameter Value Governs
ρ 0.95 Growth in Country E
β 0.96 Household Discouting
γ 2 Disutility of labor
θ 0.5 Service share
ν 0.3 Labor Share
α 0.5 Share of Managerial Households
ϕ 0.05 Fixed Cost of Adjustment
Table 2.4: Parameter Values
I parameterize the model such that in a frictionless world, it would always be optimal to
shift resources from Country A to Country E. I then set adjustment costs such that when
productivity is sufficiently low in Country E, the firm will choose to maintain resources in
Country A rather than pay the cost of adjustment. Table2.4 shows the parameterization used
in the simulations. I then conduct a simulation to see whether or not the model can generate
jobless recoveries. The experiment is to allow growth in country E, as governed by the growth
parameter ρ. Then, shock Country A with a one period negative productivity shock, equal to
one percent productivity, and allow it to decay over ten periods.
Figures 2.16 through 2.18 show the results of this experiment. As expected, before the
negative productivity shock in Country A, which occurs at period 0, the firm chooses not to
reallocate workers. Once the negative shock occurs, the firm chooses to reduce the proportion
of managers used in Country A, mAt . This can best be seen in Figure 2.17. Here we can also see
that the reduction in labor is still a horse race between increasing overall demand for managerial
services (and thus nM,t since they are created using a linear technology) and falling demand
for labor in Country A. During the recovery, we see stagnant labor markets, even as GDP
is increasing. In this sense, the model is able to qualitatively match the features of a jobless
recovery. Moreover, as Figure 2.18 shows, labor productivity falls initially, but recovers very
quickly. In fact, labor productivity is growing even as labor inputs are stagnant or even falling.
This is a feature of recent recessions which is puzzling in the context of a standard RBC model.
However, in the context of a simple growth model with asymmetric growth, I am able to generate
this feature.
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Figure 2.16: GDP and Labor
Figure 2.17: Labor Inputs
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Figure 2.19 shows the predictions of the model for trade. The model (counterfactually)
predicts that imports should increase, causing the trade balance to fall, over the course of the
recession. In fact, it predicts a large drop in the trade balance just as the negative productivity
shock hits Country A. This is because reallocation occurs during this period, causing more
consumption goods to be produced in Country E. Perfect risk-sharing implies that households
in Country A simply borrow in order to continue to consume these goods when their income
falls during the recession.
Figure 2.18: Labor Productivity
55
Figure 2.19: Labor Productivity
Overall, the model is able to produce the desired features. It certainly has some limitations,
but this section shows that the proposed mechanism is a promising one in being able to account
for jobless recoveries. In the next section, I discuss what additional steps need to be taken in
order to quantify the impact of the mechanism.
2.6 Calibration and Future Work
Sections 4 and 5 illustrate that globalization shows promise in terms of helping to account for
the recent observed changes in labor market outcomes. In order to more fully assess the model’s
ability to account for jobless recoveries, it will be necessary to use a more seriously calibrated
model.
As explored in Section 4, the parameters that are important for the results are the labor and
managerial shares (ν and θ), the disutility of labor (γ), and the share of each type of household
(α). In the current version of the paper, I use a standard value for measured labor share, ν, and
have set managerial share, θ, guided by financial and operating data of multinationals from the
BEA. MNCs also provide data that divides employees into job functions and provides data on
their compensation. Using this, I can back out the managerial and labor shares for the types of
companies I have in mind. In order to match the disutility of labor, γ, I will match the average
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hours worked by households, calculated using the Current Population Survey (CPS). I will need
to assume a number of discretionary hours available to a household and then I will match the
fraction of that time spent working. The share of each type of household in the economy, α,
can also be inputed from the CPS. I can define M-type households as those that have a certain
level of education. Then, I can calculate α directly from the CPS.
The other parameter that will be very important is that that governs adjustment costs,
φ. In my numerical example above, results are somewhat sensitive to this parameter. It is
not possible to measure adjustment costs in the data, since many of the things we think of as
causing adjustment to be costly are intangible. For example, the time cost to hiring a manager
is an adjustment cost and this is difficult to measure. Moreover, it is difficult to make the case
that the cost of hiring a manager to work in the U.S. is the same as the cost of training that
manager to go work in China. In order to calibrate this parameter, I plan to close the economy
and try to match business adjustments in the pre-1990 period. This will give me a lower bound
on what adjustment costs should be since the cost of shifting managerial services to another
country should be higher than the cost of hiring an extra manager to work in the U.S. Therefore,
a calibration of this sort will give me a lower bound on the share of jobless recoveries that can
be accounted for by the mechanism.
I will also need to choose a growth path for zE . I will use the trend growth in MNC
employment in low-income countries in order to discipline this. This will allow me to match
hiring trends by construction. Taking those as given, I will be able to then see if these trends
can account for jobless recoveries.
In terms of my empirical work, I have applied to use firm-level data from the BEA in
order to see whether multinational firms choose to expand more into countries with high growth
rates. This could help to support the main idea behind the model. I also am working on the
aforementioned extension of Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2011). Although this is not directly
related to the model that I have written down, it will help guide an extension that I have mind.
In future work, I would like to incorporate another type of firm into the economy in order to
consider the trade channel as well. I also think it would be interesting to explore the idea that
firms may be shifting resources to the emerging country in order to serve the local market in
these countries. In this set up, companies again would wait until reallocation is cheap in order
to shift resources. I think with this added idea, I might be able to capture the drop in trade
flows that occurs around recessions while still capturing a drop in employment.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a model with decreasing cross-country productivity differences in order
to explore whether international reallocation contributes to slower labor recoveries in advanced
economies. I find that a simple growth model with multinational corporations, asymmetric
growth, and adjustment costs is able to generate both a secular decline in the employment
to population ratio and a concentration in that decline around recessions, leading to jobless
recoveries. Additionally, I show some empirical evidence that the elements that I include in the
model are supported by the data.
From a policy perspective, it is important to understand the contributing sources of jobless
recoveries. The policy implications might be very different if jobless recoveries arise due to
skill-biased technical change than if the root cause of jobless recoveries is increased globalization
and competition from emerging markets. The model I have build is a promising step towards
quantifying the impact that globalization has had upon the changing business cycle properties
of labor markets. This, in turn, can guide policy discussions about the role of globalizaiton in
supporting economic growth and its distributional consequences. The model predicts that with
GDP growth comes growing inequality. From a welfare perspective, it’s not clear what the policy
implication of this finding might be. Therefore, a more realistic calibration is an important next
step to conducting policy analysis.
Chapter 3
Trade, Technology, and the Skill
Premium: The Case Of Mexico
3.1 Introduction
Standard trade theory has stark predictions for how factor prices should respond to trade inte-
gration between a skill-scarce and a skill-abundant country. In particular, models that are based
on the Heckscher-Ohlin (henceforth H-O) theory predict that the ratio of wages paid to skilled
versus unskilled workers (the skill premium) should rise in the skill-abundant country and fall
in the skill-scarce country when the two countries open to trade with one another. A puzzle
that has arisen in the context of this prediction is that when integrating with the world econ-
omy, many skill-scarce countries instead experience rising skill premia. Mexico is the canonical
example of a country whose skill premium not only rose, but rose by much more than that of
its more-developed counterpart, the United States, during the period in which Mexico opened
its borders to trade with the United States. These observations have led many researchers to
conclude that skill-biased technological change (SBTC), not increased openness to trade, has
driven changes in developing economies’ skill premia.
In this paper, I argue that trade liberalization, by stimulating investment in SBTC and
facilitating cross-border technology adoption, plays an important role in explaining these facts.
I modify a standard trade model to include trade in technology, which occurs through the
integration of supply chains across borders. I use the case of the Mexican trade liberalization and
integration into the supply chain of American companies to explore the impact that technological
transfer, which takes place as a part of this integration, has upon the wages of workers in
Mexico and the United States. I calibrate the model using surveys of the Mexican and the U.S.
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manufacturing sectors and I find that a reduction in barriers to trade in goods and technology
can account for about two-thirds of the observed increase in the skill premium in both Mexico
and the United States.
To support my quantitative analysis, I provide empirical evidence both at the plant- and
the industry-level that indicates that Mexican entities which trade more with the United States
have higher skill premia on average and have greater increases in their skill premia in the late-
1980s than their non-trading counterparts. This analysis suggests that trade connections are an
important determinant of skill premia and that supply chains could be channels through which
technology is transferred. While I do not have direct information about connections between
the Mexican plants and the firms that they are supplying in the United States1, I show that
trade between the two countries rose dramatically over the course of the late-1980s and early
1990s. Moreover, intra-industry trade began to dominate Mexican-U.S. trade during the mid-
1980s and has continued to do so ever since. I also show that at the industry-level, the use
of intermediate imports is an important predictor of the skill premium, indicating that supply
chain relationships play an important role in determining the skill premium in a given industry.
In order to assess the quantitative importance of supply chains on the skill premium, I adapt
a standard trade model to allow for trade liberalization to increase both trade in goods and trade
in ideas. I model “ideas” as technology capital, similar to the model in McGrattan and Prescott
(2009), but I allow for technology capital to be rented from final goods producers, who own and
invest in the stock of technology capital, to intermediate goods producers, who use it. I model
trade liberalization as a reduction both in tariffs on goods and in taxes on flows of royalties.
I discipline my exercise using manufacturing data from Mexico, as well as data on the flow of
royalty payments and trade between Mexico and the United States.
My model differs from those in the existing literature by incorporating two key ingredients.
First, I allow for skill-biased technology to be endogenously accumulated by permitting firms to
invest in a stock of technology that is assumed to be skill-augmenting. I consider a final goods
producers who own and invest in technology capital. Intermediate suppliers rent this technology
capital in order to produce an intermediate product that will be a component of the final good.
Consider for the moment a two country world in which both countries are in autarky. Now,
when a country opens to trade, a final goods producer does not need to open a plant in the
foreign country in order to use his technology capital there. Instead, he can rent his technology
to an intermediate goods producer that is already operating in the foreign country. Opening
1The plant-level data provides information on total imports and exports, as well as information on
the percent of imports (exports) that come from (go to) the United States. However, I do not have
information on the specific trade relationships between the Mexican plants and U.S. producers. This
information was not gathered as part of the annual survey and, presumably, is not included in the
balance sheets of unaffiliated trade partners.
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to trade, therefore, increases the return to technology capital, as in McGrattan and Prescott
(2009). Firms respond to these increased returns to their technology capital by investing more.
I refer to this as the “investment channel,” and it is the main channel that drives the increase
in the skill premium seen in the United States. This is consistent with recent empirical work
in Goel (2012) which provides evidence that firms in the United States respond to increased
trade opportunities by increasing spending on innovation. Moreover, it is consistent with extant
literature which has found that the rise in the skill premium in the United States is driven
primarily by technological change. Note that this does not mean that opening to trade plays
no role in increasing the skill premium, but rather, that its role manifests as an increase in
technology, driven by increased returns on investment in technology.
Second, I allow technology capital to be rented across borders. I provide plant-level evidence
that royalties paid by importers/exporters as a percentage of inputs in Mexico are higher than
those of their non-trading counterparts, indicating that these plants pay a greater percentage of
their costs for rental of technology than their non-trading counterparts; I take this as evidence
of transfer of technology across countries. Allowing for technology to be transferred through
rental is the key to having the skill premium rise in both countries because it causes the skill
premium to rise in the United States via the investment channel, as discussed above, and it
causes the skill premium to rise in Mexico by what I will call the “adoption channel.” In the
model, intermediate goods producers in Mexico choose to adopt U.S. technology and supply
U.S. final goods producers much more than vice versa. This is because, in the initial steady
state, U.S. technology is much more productive than Mexican technology.
In my calibrated model, I find that moving from an autarkic steady state to a free trade
steady state induces a skill premium increase of 39 percent in Mexico and 8 percent in the United
States. This accounts for about two-thirds of the observed rise in the Mexican skill premium,
and about three-quarters of the increase observed in the United States.
The adoption channel is key to obtaining these results. If I shut down firms’ ability to
trade technology, under certain parametrization, results show the standard Stolper-Samuelson
effect, with Mexico’s skill premium declining and that of the United States increasing. The
Stolper-Samuelson effect is offset, however, by the investment channel. I include two sectors in
the model-one that is skilled-labor intensive and one that is unskilled-labor intensive-in order to
allow for this type of effect, but both sectors use skill-augmenting technology capital. Opening
to trade allows countries to specialize in the sector in which they have a comparative advantage,
which in turn increases the return to the factors of production, thus inducing firms to invest more
in the skill-augmenting technology in that sector. This raises the return to skilled workers for all
countries, reducing the decline in the skill premium in Mexico. The big gain in the Mexican skill
premium comes, however, through the rental of advanced technology from the United States. In
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the model, there is an initial jump in the skill premium in Mexico as U.S. technology becomes
available to Mexican firms. This results from the sudden inflow of this technology into Mexico,
which occurs when the tax on royalties is reduced and the price of renting the U.S. technology
falls as a consequence.
My quantitative results are disciplined by manufacturing data for the United States and
Mexico. Because my interest lies primarily in how the skill premium changed in the two countries,
I target the level of the skill premium in the initial period. I use aggregated industry data
from Mexico on royalty payments to pin down the parameter that governs the importance of
technology capital in production. In particular, I match royalty payments as a percentage of
payroll payments in the period before trade liberalization. I use 1985 as the “pre-reform” period;
as I will document below, the majority of Mexican trade reforms began in 1986. I also match the
relative productivity of the manufacturing sectors in the two countries and the relative supply
of skilled workers in each country in 1985. I match these moments in a pre-reform steady state.
In order to see how trade reform impacts the skill premium, I then conduct an experiment
where I lower tariffs on goods and taxes on royalties. While I am able to directly observe the
reduction in tariffs that occurred in the data, I am not able to observe directly a measure of the
taxes on royalties. This is because things such as the protection of intellectual property would
have a strong impact on firms’ willingness to rent proprietary information to other firms and
these protections changed substantially over the period of interest. Therefore, I use flows data
in order to give an idea of the magnitude of the change on this implicit tax. Using this backed
out tax, I calculate a new steady state, holding everything other than the tax rates fixed. I
find that opening to trade in both technology and goods increases the skill premium in both
countries. I am able to decompose this change in the skill premium and attribute most of the
rise in the skill premium in Mexico to the adoption channel and all of the rise in the United
States to the investment channel.
Contribution to Related Literature
There is a large body of literature dealing with the rise of the skill premium in the United States,
and a somewhat smaller literature on the rise of the skill premium in Mexico. Studies such as
Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), Feenstra and Hanson (1997b), and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) have shown that increasing imports of intermediate goods from less-developed countries
can increase skill premia in advanced economies. For a useful summary of articles that have
explored the behavior of the skill premium of developing countries as they open to trade, see
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
The paper that is most closely related to my own is Feenstra and Hanson’s 1996 empirical and
theoretical work on the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico. Empirically,
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the authors show that regions with a higher proportion of inward FDI from the United States
have greater increases in the relative demand for skilled labor. Furthermore, they build a
theoretical model which rationalizes this prediction; capital is complementary with skilled labor,
and as capital flows from the United States to Mexico via foreign direct investment, demand for
skilled labor rises in Mexico. The Mexican subsidiary of the multinational in Mexico produces a
less-skilled intermediate which is then substituted for less-skilled workers in the United States.
Thus, the relative demand for unskilled workers falls in the United States as well. I see my
paper as a complement to their work. At the aggregate level, flows of foreign direct investment
between Mexico and the United States did not rise substantially until the mid-1990s. Moreover,
the majority of growth in both maquiladora2 establishments and employment came after the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (GAO, 2005), and as such post-dates the
observed growth in the skill premium in Mexico. I focus on the transfer of technology through
non-ownership channels precisely because trade increases substantially before NAFTA but direct
investment does not. I provide evidence that supply chains are an important channel through
which technology is transferred. The mechanism proposed in their paper is also similar to what
I propose. However, in their setup, the investment channel that I describe is not present. This
is because the type of capital they consider is physical capital, which can be only used in one
location at a time. I, instead, consider technology capital which can be used in multiple locations
at once. Therefore, once a firm has more than one location in which to use its technology, it
has an increased incentive to invest in it. This is the primary driver of the increase of the skill
premium in the United States in my model, whereas in the Feenstra and Hanson model, the
increase in the skill premium in the United States is primarily driven by Stolper-Samuelson
effects.
I also contribute to the emerging literature on the interaction between trade, technology,
and inequality. Works such as Acemoglu (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Burstein and Vogel
(2012), and Goel (2012) all address the idea that trade and technological innovation are linked.
All but Burstein and Vogel concentrate primarily on the rise of the skill premium in advanced
countries. The papers by Acemoglu and coauthors mention that their mechanism can generate
increasing skill premia in developing countries if technology is transmitted, though there is no
evident way for the increase in the skill premium in the developing country to be greater than
the increase in the skill premium in the developed country. My paper complements their work
by providing a plausible mechanism by which this technological transmission occurs as well as
provides a framework in which it is possible to get larger increases in the skill premium in the
less-developed country. Goel provides evidence for increased investment in innovation resulting
from increased imports of intermediate goods from less-developed countries and develops a
2manufacturing plants in the free trade zone
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model which generates the increasing investment in innovation that she documents. However,
her model does not include skilled workers in the developing country. If it did, the skill premium
would counter-factually fall in the developing country. Burstein and Vogel build a quantitative
trade model a la Bernard et al. (2003) with exogenous productivity which is skill-augmenting.
Technology within a country is endogenous in that there is firm entry and exit in response to
international competition. The most productive firms, which are consequently the most skill-
intensive firms, are those that become exporters. The least productive firms exit in response to
head-to-head foreign competition. While the model proposed by Burstein and Vogel allows for
a quantitative exploration of trade linkages, it abstracts from the type of trade in ideas that I
propose here. Additionally, they are able to account for only a small portion of the observed
increase in the skill premium in Mexico and the United States, even when considering the case
of complete autarky versus free trade.
This paper is also related to the literature that has explored the impact of globalization on
Mexican labor markets. A number of studies (for example, see Esquivel and Rodriguez-Lopez,
2003; Harrison and Hanson, 1999; and Robertson, 2004) explore this question using the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem as their basis, and find the correlation between changes in output prices
and wages at the industry level to be very low. The conclusion from this strand of literature
was that skill-biased technological change, and not trade, was responsible for the observed
increase in the skill premium. Verhoogen (2008) explores both overall increase in inequality and
the between-plant inequality in Mexico and hypothesizes that exporting opportunities increase
wage dispersion across plants due to quality upgrading. Rian˜o (2009) builds a model in which
SBTC is embodied in capital equipment and measures the effect of increasing imports of capital
equipment upon the skill premium in Mexico. The idea in his paper is similar to what I model
here, but importantly, the capital that is traded in my model is technology capital or “ideas.”
The non-rivalrous nature of technology capital creates an environment such that even as the
capital begins to be used in Mexico, firms in the United States have an incentive to invest more
in it. In fact, it is because the ideas are being used in an additional location that their marginal
product increases.
Also related to this paper is the literature on the skill premia in developing countries.
Ripoll (2005) builds a model in which the skill premium in the developing country responds
non-monotonically to trade liberalization and depends heavily on the initial conditions in the
economy. Trefler and Zhu (2005) show that those countries with the largest increase in skill
premia following a trade liberalization are those which export relatively more skill-intensive
goods, and they build a model akin to Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), but allowing the “South”
to catch up to the technology of the “North” instead of receiving FDI flows. They do not
propose a mechanism for how this catch-up occurs. Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2013) and
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Parro (2013) each propose capital-embodied technology as an avenue by which skill-biased tech-
nological change crosses borders. I contribute to this literature by proposing an alternative way
that this technology is accumulated and then transmitted from one country to the next, and I
provide evidence of my hypothesis.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2 I provide brief background information on
the trade liberalization experience in Mexico in the late 1980s; in Section 3.3 I provide evidence
for the importance of trade linkages for the skill premium: Section 3.4 contains my model and its
theoretical analysis; Section 3.5 contains my calibration and results; and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background: Trade Reform in Mexico
This section briefly describes the liberalization policies that were implemented in Mexico in the
mid-1980s.
Mexico’s Trade Liberalization
During the 1950s, Mexico began to pursue a set of policies based on the theory of import
substitution. As such, during this time, Mexico became one of the most closed economies in the
world, with more than 90 percent of its domestic production subject to import licenses by 1985.
Import licenses are commonly viewed as the main source of restricted trade flows (Kehoe, 1995,
TenKate 1992), though, in practice, Mexico utilized three instruments to restrict these flows:
(i) ad-velorum tariffs, (ii) official minimum prices for custom valuation, and (iii) quantitative
restrictions such as quotas and the aforementioned import licenses. As a result of the balance of
payments crisis in 1982, the Mexican government decided to pursue a large-scale liberalization
of the Mexican economy, including a massive trade liberalization (apertura), in order to restart
economic growth.
In 1985, the Mexican government undertook a number of structural reforms, including re-
ducing the import license coverage from 92 percent to 47 percent between June and December
of that year. Many of these reforms were requirements of the debt restructuring agreement
that Mexico entered with its international creditors in the wake of the debt crisis in the early
1980s. The government continued to phase out import licenses over the course of the decade,
with the coverage falling to 23 percent in 1988 and 19 percent in 1989. Most of the remaining
import licenses covered agricultural and petroleum refining products. Over the same period,
ad-velorum tariffs fell as well. In 1985, the maximum tariff was 100 percent; only a year later,
in 1986, it was reduced to 50 percent. By 1987, the maximum tariff was 20 percent and the
production-weighted average tariff was 11 percent (Esquivel and Tornell, 1995).
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Mexico also entered into trade negotiations with the United States in 1987, which culmi-
nated in a four-part understanding known as the “Framework of Principles and Procedures
for Consultation Regarding Trade and Investment Relations” or the “Bilateral Accord.” This
Accord was the first-ever formal bilateral agreement governing commercial relations between
the two countries, and it included a statement of principles, a mechanism for consultations,
an agreement on data exchange, and an Immediate Action Agenda. The Immediate Action
Agenda was the start of negotiations on a number of matters, including technology transfer.
In particular, Mexico was interested in obtaining help from developed nations to develop its
intellectual property rights protection laws so that technological transfer from companies in the
United States would be more forthcoming. Mexico argued that access to new technologies was
of utmost importance and was a necessary component to any improved trade arrangement be-
tween the two countries (DuMars, 1991). The recognition of intellectual property rights was an
important step to allowing for transfer of technology between the two countries.
During this period, the government also began to loosen its restrictions on foreign owner-
ship; however, the process was slower to change than other policies, and significant restrictions
remained in place for the next decade. In particular, foreign companies were not allowed to
acquire existing Mexican firms without submitting to a lengthy approval process. Establishing
a new foreign-owned business was somewhat easier, but only if the business fit certain criteria,
which included a requirement that the business have at least a non-negative net export balance
over the first three years of its existence. Maquiladora firms were exceptions to these rules, but
the process for obtaining a license establishing a firm as a maquiladora was viewed as relatively
cumbersome until the process was reformed in December of 1989.
In 1992, the Mexican government signed an agreement to enter into the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada on January 1, 1994. As part of
NAFTA, all remaining tariffs on goods traded between the two countries would be phased out
over the next decade. Moreover, the three countries agreed to abide by the intellectual property
rights laws of the United States.
3.3 Evidence on Skill Premia and Trade
In this section, I present evidence on the rise of skill premia in Mexico and the United States.
I also show that trade, both in goods and in ideas (technology), may be an important factor
in determining plant-level skill premia. I first describe the data. Second, I establish that over
the period from 1985 to 1996, the aggregate skill premium in manufacturing rose by about
three times as much in Mexico as it did in the United States. I then show that this coincides
with a large rise in trade between the two countries. Next, I turn to plant- and industry-level
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data in order to show that plants who were integrated into the supply chain of the United
States (meaning those who both import from and export to the United States) tend to have
higher overall skill premia than their counterparts who do not engage in both of these activities.
Moreover, I provide industry-level evidence imports of intermediate goods are an important
predictor of the rise in skill premia from 1984 to 1994.
3.3.1 Data Description
Data for Mexico’s manufacturing sector comes from INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica
y Geograf´ıa), Mexico’s national statistics bureau. I gather aggregate skill premium data from
the EIA (Encuesta Industrial Anual), which is an annual survey of manufacturers. Aggregate
data from 1980 through 2004 is publicly available on INEGI’s website. I gather data on produc-
tion and non-production employees and payments to these two groups and construct the skill
premium as the ratio of non-production wages to production wages, as is standard in the liter-
ature. Industry-level data is available by request for years 1984 through 1994, and plant-level
data is available from 1984 through 1990. The plant-level data includes information on imports
and exports by plant for the years 1986 to 1990. This information was gathered in a special
survey conducted by the World Bank. I clean the plant-level data to eliminate any unusual
observations, which may indicate coding error. The exact procedure used is detailed in the data
appendix. For a more detailed description of the plant-level data, see Tybout and Westbrook
(1995).
Data for the U.S. manufacturing sector is obtained from the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Productivity Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). This data is available from 1959 through
2010. Again, the database provides information on production and non-production employees,
as well as payments to each group. I then construct the skill premium as the ratio of non-
production wages to production wages. I compare the manufacturing skill premium to the ratio
of college to non-college wages, which I compute using the Current Population Survey (CPS).
I obtain the March CPS from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population
Survey (IPUMS CPS) at the Minnesota Population Center. I then compute the ratio of wages
for working age people with some college and above to those with no college, and call this the
“college premium.”
Aggregate trade data for Mexico is obtained from the World Bank World Development Indi-
cators Database (WDI). I gather information on imports, exports, and gross domestic product,
as well as subsets of the trade data. In particular, I examine merchandise trade, merchandise
trade with advanced economies, and trade in manufactures. Each variable gathered is expressed
in millions of U.S. dollars. I then express each trade variable as a percentage of gross domestic
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product. I cross reference these trade data with data from the NBER’s U.S. imports and ex-
ports database, 1972-1994, (Feenstra 1996, 1997) to verify that the majority of the increase in
Mexico’s trade was with the United States.
Information on intermediate imports is gathered from the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD) Structural Analysis (STAN) Database. This database
provides total bilateral imports and exports, as well as intermediate bilateral imports and ex-
ports, between the U.S. and Mexico for years 1990 through 2010 for broad industries. I match
this data (1990-1994) with the industry-level data for Mexican manufacturing for the same broad
sectors.
3.3.2 Skill Premia in Mexico and the United States
In Mexico, the skill premium (measured as the ratio of non-production to production wages)
was stable at 2 during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but began to rise around 1986. It grew
for the next decade and peaked at about 3.1 in 1996. This can be seen in Figure 3.1(a). The
U.S. experienced similar timing in the rise of the same variable. Note that the college premium,
measured as the ratio of college to non-college wages began to rise earlier in the 1980s. The
college premium is the measure which is frequently the concentration of papers dealing only
with the United States, but I will concentrate on comparable measures in this paper. As can be
seen in Figure 3.1, the manufacturing skill premium in the United States also began to rise in
the mid-1980s.
(a) Levels (b) Relative to 1980
Figure 3.1: Skill Premia in U.S. and Mexico
Figure 3.1 also shows that the skill premium in Mexico was substantially higher than that in
the United States and rose by much more over the period of interest. Figure 3.1(b) shows that
68
the timing of the increases in the two skill premia largely coincided. It also highlights that the
increase in Mexico was substantially greater. In particular, over the course of the decade from
1986 to 1996, the skill premium in Mexico rose by about 60%, while the skill premium in the
United States rose by about 10 to 15%.3The timing and magnitude of the increase in the college
premium is similar to that of the manufacturing skill premium, though the manufacturing skill
premium does not exhibit the same drop as the college premium in the 1970s.
Figure 3.2: Manufacturing Skill Premium and College Premium in U.S.
Figure 3.2 shows how the college premium and the manufacturing skill premium move to-
gether in the United States. I measure the college premium as the ratio of wages of those with
at least one year of college to those with no college education. As is well known, the college
premium fell over the course of the 1970s as the supply of college-educated workers grew. Dur-
ing this period, the manufacturing skill premium remained flat. If you disregard the education
premium drop that occurred over the 1970s, the panels of Figure 3.2 show that the timing of
the rise in the education and manufacturing skill premium largely coincide. In particular, when
I normalize the college premium to 1 in 1970 (as in the second panel of the figure), it can be
seen that the two series begin to rise above their long-run trend at about the same time, and
by 2000 they had risen by roughly the same amount. The rise in the skill and education premia
3Again, the measure of the skill premium is different from the one that is often cited in the literature
concerning the rise of inequality in the United States.
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from 1985 to 2000 is roughly 12 percent. Therefore, the skill premium in Mexico rose by about
four times as much from 1986 to 2000.
3.3.3 Increase of Manufacturing Trade
In this section, I show that the increase in the skill premium in Mexico largely coincides with an
increase in manufacturing trade. Figure 3.3(a) shows Mexican imports and exports of manufac-
tured goods, measured in real U.S. dollars. This data was gathered from the World Development
Indicators database. We can see that trade in manufactured goods began to rise in the mid-1980s
and reached its peak in the early 2000s. This timing is consistent with the growth of the skill
premium in Mexican manufacturing documented above. Notably, the growth in exports and
imports begins well before the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).
(a) Manufacturing Trade (b) Merchandise Trade
Figure 3.3: Mexican Trade
Figure 3.3(b) documents the percent of merchandise trade that was taking place with high-
income countries. The solid lines represent the total amount of merchandise imports (blue) and
exports (red) and the dotted lines show the merchandise trade occurring with high-income OECD
countries. I use this measure because I do not have an accurate measure of trade in manufactured
goods with high-income countries, but I do have a measure of trade in merchandise goods with
high-income countries. Merchandise trade consists almost entirely of trade in manufactured
products, especially in the later periods. I use aggregated data from the NBERs import and
export database to verify that this trade is predominantly with the United States. This figure
is meant to illustrate that Mexico’s trade liberalization in the 1980s predominantly increased
its trade with the United States, a more-developed country. This means that according to a
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standard H-O model, we should expect to see a falling skill premium in Mexico. If Mexico
had opened to more skill-scarce countries during this period, one might anticipate that its skill
premium would rise, but since it was increasing trade predominantly with the United States,
the opposite should be true.
3.3.4 Evidence that Supply Chains Matter
I now turn to the plant- and industry-level data from INEGI and present evidence that trade
linkages may be important for spreading technology and, thus, increasing the skill premium. I
first clean the data, as described in the data appendix, to eliminate any odd observations. I
then divide the plants into four groups: (1) plants which exported to the U.S. and imported
from the U.S. in 1990 (Exporter/Importer); (2) plants which exported to the U.S. but did not
import from the U.S. in 1990 (Exporter/Non-importer); (3) plants which did not export to the
U.S. but do import from the U.S. (Non-exporter/Importer) in 1990; and (4) plants which did
not export to the U.S. and do not import from the U.S. in 1990 (Non-exporter/Non-importer). I
have information about both the value of exports (imports) and the percent of exports (imports)
that go to (come from) the United States. To be classified as an exporter (importer), the plant
must (a) have positive value of exports (imports) and (b) have greater than 0% of its exports
(imports) in1990 going to the U.S. I create groups that are fixed with the export status at the
end of the sample so that I can see how becoming an exporter/importer impacts skill premia,
avoiding any compositional effects. I then create a employment-share weighted skill premium
for each category. I follow the same exercise with employee-share-weighted means, and obtain
similar results.
(a) Levels (b) Relative to 1984
Figure 3.4: Skill Premia in Mexican Industries
I will refer to the group of importer/exporters as “integrated plants” and the plants that
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neither import nor export as “non-integrated plants.” Figure 3.4(a) shows how the skill pre-
mium for each group changes over time. The integrated plants have, on average, higher skill
premia than their non-integrated counterparts. The growth in each type of plant can be seen
more clearly in Figure 3.4(b), which shows the skill premium in each group normalized to 1
in 1984. It shows that integrated plants had skill premia that grew by about 10% more than
the non-integrated plants. Because I have limited plant-level data, I use the information I have
about plants and industries from the plant-level data to inform my industry-level analysis. In
particular, I use the plant-level importer/exporter status in order to calculate the concentration
of integrated plants in any given industry. In order to do this, I calculate the industry-specific
probability that a firm is “integrated” as
Pr(integrated) =
Nimporter/exporter,i
Ni
for each industry i. I then define an industry as integrated if the fraction of integrated firms in
that industry is greater than 40 percent. Examples of integrated industries include manufacture
of cars and car parts, glass and glass items, computers and electronics, and household appliances.
I then am able to look at how the skill premium evolves in these industries over time using
industry-level data from INEGI.
Figure 3.5: Skill Premium by Integrated/Non-Integrated Industry
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the skill premium in integrated versus non-integrated
industries, with the blue line representing the integrated industries and the red line representing
the non-integrated industries. Notice that the skill premia in the two groups is about equal in
1984, with the skill premium in the non-integrated industries being slightly higher. The skill
premium rises in both types of industries over the next decade; however, it rises by more in the
integrated industries and by 1994, the skill premium is about10 percent higher in the integrated
industries.
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In order to further explore how trade integration impacts the skill premium, I match the
industry-level data on manufacturing wages and employment to trade data from the OECD
STAN database. I have information on intermediate imports, intermediate exports, total im-
ports, and total exports for 20 industries from 1990 to 1994. I match this information to the
information on the skill premium for the same broad industries. I then examine the relationship
between imports of intermediates, exports, royalty payments, and the skill premia by industry.
In order to do this, I first estimate the following equation:
SPi,t = β0 + β1
(
Royalties
Y
)
i,t
+ β2
(
Exp
Y
)
i,t
+ γt + ηi + i,t
Variable SPi,t SPi,t
(1) (2)
Constant 1.894∗∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.149)
Royalties
Y i,t
1.220∗∗∗ 2.230∗∗∗
(0.116) (1.154)
Exports
Y i,t
0.308∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.243)
Industry Fixed Effects? No Yes
Time Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
R2 0.064 0.200
Table 3.1: Regression Results
Table 3.1 reflects that this estimation mimics what other authors have found. In particular,
exporting is associated with increasing skill premia when we do not consider other sources of
variation. Moreover, royalties are positively correlated with increasing skill premia, indicating
that those industries that make large payments for technology rental (as a percentage of output)
have, on average, higher skill premia. In order to test whether integration into supply chains is
an important factor, I include both imports of intermediates and exports of intermediates and
estimate the following equation.
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SPi,t = β0 + β1
(
Royalties
Y
)
i,t
+ β2
(
Exp
Y
)
i,t
+ β3
(
Imp
Y
)
i,t
+ γt + ηi + i,t
Variable SPi,t SPi,t
(1) (2)
Constant 2.783∗∗∗ 2.695∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.151)
Royalties
Y i,t
1.451∗∗∗ 2.518∗∗∗
(0.118) (1.157)
Exports
Y i,t
−1.251∗∗∗ −0.305
(0.378) (0.369)
Imports
Y i,t
2.549∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.532)
Industry Fixed Effects? No Yes
Time Fixed Effects? Yes Yes
R2 0.075 0.200
Table 3.2: Regression Results
From Table 3.2, we can see that including intermediate imports negates the effects of ex-
porting. In particular, the coefficient on exporting becomes negative, which is in line with the
Stolper-Samuelson predictions, whereas the coefficient on intermediate imports is positive, sta-
tistically significant, and large. So, exporting is associated with low skill premia and importing
is associated with high skill premia. I interpret these results as indicating that supply chains
are an important determinant of skill premia. In light of this evidence, I build a model in
which importing plays a role in determining the skill premium. I am going to think of this as
importing “ideas” or technology. Those plants that export intermediate goods are going to need
to use imported ideas in order to produce intermediate goods for the final goods producer in
the United States. I will have a single wage in Mexico, so all plants will experience the same
increase in the skill premium, but the increase in the skill premium will be driven by the plants
who integrate with the supply chain of the United States and share the technology of the U.S.
final goods producers. There will also be trade in goods and this will produce the standard
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Stolper-Samuelson effect. Therefore, the relative importance of technology in production will
determine the size of the increase of the skill premium.
3.4 Model
In this section, I first lay out a modified trade model with two sectors and trade in both goods
and in ideas. I then illustrate how the mechanism operates in the context of the one-sector
model. Finally, I compare the model to the Heckscher-Ohlin model and discuss how the two
differ from one another.
3.4.1 Model of Trade in Goods and Ideas
I describe a two-sector trade model in which allow labor is allowed to move freely across sectors
but not across countries. In this environment, I can explore how technology sharing interacts
with Stolper-Samuelson effects.
Environment
There are two countries (U and M), each with two perfectly competitive final good producing
sectors (sector X and sector Y ) which purchase differentiated intermediate goods from mo-
nopolistic competitors. Final goods producers invest in a stock of technology capital (Z) which
is assumed to be skill augmenting. Households in country k value consumption, inelastically
supply skilled labor (Hk) and unskilled labor (Lk), and save using a one period bond (b). Time
is infinite and discrete.
Final Goods Producers: Sector X
The final good producers in sector X in country k maximize the discounted stream of dividends.
They produce a single final consumption good (Xk), using differentiated intermediates produced
in country k (xk(i)), and invest in a skill-augmenting technology capital (Zk,x) that they rent
to the intermediate goods producers. The numeraire good will be Y and Pxis the relative price
of good X in terms of good Y .
The problem of the final goods producers in country k is:
V (ZX) = max
(
Dk,X +mV (Z
′
x)
)
s.t.
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Dk,X = Px( Xk − Ik,x) + rk,xZk,X −
∫
Nk,x
px(i)xk(i)di
Ik,x = Bk(Z
′
k,x + (1− δy)Zk,x)
Xk =
[∫
Nk,x
xk(i)
φdi
]1/φ
where m is the households’ discount rate. Here, dividends are equal to output minus in-
vestment plus royalties minus payments for intermediates. I am assuming that the investment
technology converts a single unit of good X into Bkunits of investment goods.
Intermediate Goods Producers: xk(i)
The intermediate goods producer in country k can produce both for the domestic market and for
the foreign market. He chooses output (x(i)), skilled labor (hk,x(i)), unskilled labor (lk,x(i)), and
amount of technology (Zk,x) to maximize profits, taking wages and the rental rate for technology
as given. The producer must use the technology of the firm that they are supplying in order to
produce the intermediate for that firm. There is a country-specific productivity parameter, Ak.
max
x(i),hk,x(i),lk,x(i),Zx
px(i)x(i)− wHk hk,x(i)− wLk lk,x(i)− rk,xZk,x
s.t
xk(i) = Ak
[
ωx
(
Zαk,xhk,x(i)
1−α)σ−1σ + (1− ωx)lk,x(i)σ−1σ ] σσ−1
x(i) = px(i)
1
1−ρXk
Here, I assume that intermediate goods producers of goods xk(i) only supply the final goods
producers in their own country. Therefore, they only have access to the technology of the final
goods producers in their own country; in other words, there is trade in technology in sector X.
I will assume that sector X is more unskilled labor intensive than sector Y .
Final Goods Producers: Sector Y
The final good producers in sector Y in country k maximize the discounted stream of dividends.
They produce a single final consumption good (Yk), using differentiated intermediates produced
in country k (yk(i)), and invest in a skill-augmenting technology capital (Zk,y) that they rent
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to the intermediate goods producers.
The problem of the final goods producers in country k is:
V (Zk,y) = maxDk,y +mV (Z
′
k,y)
s.t.
Dk,y = Yk − Ik,y + Zk,y (rk,y + r−k,y)−
∫
Nk,y
py(i)yk(i)di− (1 + τy)
∫
N−k,y
py(i)y−k(i)di
Ik,y = Bk
(
Z
′
k,y + (1− δy)Zk,y
)
Yk =
[∫
Nk,y
yk(i)
ρdi+
∫
N−k,y
y−k(i)ρdi
]1/ρ
Again, dividends are equal to output minus investment plus royalties received for rental of
technology minus the cost of intermediate inputs. In sector Y , the final goods producer rents
its technology to and buys intermediates from firms in the foreign country, as well as the home
country. In this sense, in sector Y there is “trade in ideas”, or technology sharing. Moreover,
notice that in sector Y , the final good producer purchases intermediates from both countries,
so they integrate over all intermediates in their own country (Nk,y) and intermediates from the
foreign country (N−k,y).
Intermediate Goods Producers: y(i)
The intermediate goods producer in country k can produce both for the domestic market and
for the foreign market. He chooses output (yk(i)), skilled labor to produce for the domestic
market (hk,k,y(i)), skilled labor to produce for the foreign market (hk,−k,y(i)), unskilled labor
to produce for the domestic market (lk,k,y(i)), unskilled labor to produce for the foreign market
(lk,−k,y(i)), and amount of domestic and foreign technology (Zk,y,Z−k,y) to maximize profits,
taking wages and the rental rate for technology as given. Here, the first subscript refers to
the country in which the good is produced and the second refers to the country which is being
supplied. Again, the producer must use the technology of the firm that they are supplying in
order to produce the intermediate for that firm.
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These firms solve the following problem:
max
yk(i),hk,y(i),lk,y(i),Zy
py(i)(yk(i) + y−k(i))− wHk (hk,y(i) + h−k,y(i))
− wLk (lk,y(i) + l−k,y(i))− rk,yZk,y − (1 + τz)r−k,yZ−k,y
s.t.
yk(i) = Ak
[
ωy
(
Zαk,yh
1−α
k,k,y(i)
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− ωy) l
σ−1
σ
k,k,y(i)
] σ
σ−1
yk(i) = Ak
[
ωy
(
Zα−k,yh
1−α
k,−k,y(i)
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− ωy) l
σ−1
σ
k,−k,y(i)
] σ
σ−1
yk(i) = py(i)
1
1−ρYk
y−k(i) = py(i)
1
1−ρY−k
I assume that if an intermediate goods producer supplies intermediates to the foreign final
goods producer, it must pay a tax τz on the royalties paid to the final goods producer. I allow
for intermediate goods producers to supply both the domestic and the foreign markets and the
amount of production they choose to do in each will endogenously adjust to the amount of tax
they have to pay on royalties. I will discuss this tax in detail in the next section.
Households
Households in country k choose a consumption bundle (ck,x, ck,y) and bonds (b
′
k) to solve the
following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt (u(ck,x) + u(ck,y))
s.t.
ck,x + ck,y + b
′
k = w
H
k Hk + w
L
kLk + (1 + r)bk
In a given country, the households are identical and so in the closed economy, no bonds will
be traded. Across countries, the endowment of high- and low-skilled labor varies.
Market Clearing
Market clearing requires that bond, labor, and goods markets clear:
78
∑
k
bk = 0
Hk =
∫
Nk
(hk,x(i) + hk,k,y(i) + hk,−k,y(i)) di
Lk =
∫
Nk
(lk,x(i) + lk,k,y(i) + lk,−k,y(i)) di
∑
k∈U,M
Xk =
∑
k∈U,M
ck,x +Bk (Zk,x + (1− δ)Zk,x)
∑
k∈U,M
Yk =
∑
k∈U,M
ck,y +Bk
(
Z
′
k,y + (1− δ)Zk,y
)
Efficiency
It can be shown that the allocations resulting from solving the above problem are efficient.
Therefore, I can solve for the allocations by solving for the efficient allocation. Consider first a
completely closed economy. The efficient allocation for a given country k solves:
max
∞∑
t=o
βt (u(cx,t, cy,t))
s.t.
cx,t +Bk,x(Zx,t+1 + (1− δ)Zy,t) = Ak
[
ωx
(
Zαk,xhk,x
1−α)σ−1σ + (1− ωx)l σ−1σk ] σσ−1
cy,t +Bk,y(Zy,t+1 + (1− δ)Zy,t) = Ak
[
ωy
(
Zαk,yhk,y
1−α)σ−1σ + (1− ωy)l σ−1σk ] σσ−1
Hk = hk,x + hk,y
Lk = lk,x + lk,y
Consider now the open economy. In this economy, final and intermediate goods are traded
and technology is shared in sector Y between the United States (U) and Mexico (M). In sector
X, only final goods are traded. The efficient allocation for the open economy solves:
max
∞∑
t=o
βt (λu(cU,x,t, cU,y,t) + (1− λ)u(cM,x,t, cM,y,t))
s.t
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Xt =AUX
σ
σ−1
U,t +AMX
σ
σ−1
M,t
Yt =
[
AρMY
ρσ
σ−1
M,M,t +A
ρ
UY
ρσ
σ−1
U,U,t +
(
AM
1 + τz
)ρ
Y
ρσ
σ−1
M,U,t
]1/ρ
Xt =
∑
k
(ck,x,t +Bk,x(Zk,x,t+1 + (1− δ)Zk,x,t)
Yt =
∑
k
(ck,y,t +Bk,y(Zk,y,t+1 + (1− δ)Zk,y,t)
Hk =hk,x + hk,−k,y + hk,k,y
Lk =lk,x + lk,−k,y + lk,k,y
where
XU,t = ωx
(
ZαU,xhU,x
1−α)σ−1σ + (1− ωx)l σ−1σU,x
XM,t = ωx
(
ZαM,xh
1−α
M,x
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− ωx)l
σ−1
σ
M,x
YM,M,t = ωy
(
ZαM,yh
1−α
M,M,y
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− ωy)l
σ−1
σ
M,M,y
YU,U,t = ωy
(
ZαU,yh
1−α
U,y
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− ωy)l
σ−1
σ
U,y
YM,U,t = ωy
(
ZαU,yh
1−α
M,U,y
)σ−1
σ
+ (1− ωy)l
σ−1
σ
M,U,y
Now, when the implicit tax on foreign technology (τz) is lowered, more technology (ZU,y)
is shared between the United States and Mexico. The total amount of technology used by
producers of intermediate goods ym(i) will be an average of the technology capital produced by
local producers and that produced by foreign producers. Therefore, if this economy goes from
being in autarky (or near autarky) to totally open (τz = 0), there will be a substantial jump in
the technology capital used in Mexico.
In order to see how this mechanism operates, consider the following simplified problem in
which there is only the integrated sector:
max
∞∑
t=o
βt (λu(cU,t) + (1− λ)u(cM,t))
s.t
80
Yt =
[
AρMY
ρσ
σ−1
M,M,t +A
ρ
UY
ρσ
σ−1
U,U,t +
(
AM
1+τz
)ρ
Y
ρσ
σ−1
M,U,t
]1/ρ
Yt =
∑
k (ck,t +Bk(Zk,t+1 + (1− δ)Zk,t)
Hk = hk,k + hk,−k
Lk = lk,k + lk,−k
I have written the planner’s problem for the open economy; recall that in the closed economy,
each country only operates and invests in its own technology (Zk). In the context of this problem,
it is easier to see how reductions in τZwill affect both the United States and Mexico. First,
consider the effect in Mexico. As τZ falls, Mexican firms substitute towards using Zybecause
it is becoming relatively more productive. Therefore, the overall level of technology used in
Mexico increases. Because technology is skill-augmenting, this increases the skill premium. The
increasing productivity of ZU will also affect the incentive to invest in that technology. As τZ
falls, the productivity of ZU rises, inducing increased investment in this technology. Therefore,
the level of ZU is higher in the open economy than the closed economy. In this setting, ZU is
decreasing in τz.
Skill Premium
The skill premium can be expressed as
SPk =
wHk
wLk
= (1− α) ωy
1− ωy
(
Zk,y
Hk,y(Zk,y)
)ασ−1σ (Hk,y(Zk,y)
Lk,y(Zk,y)
)−1/σ
In order to contrast this with the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, let’s turn again to the
stylized model. First, recall that in the standard H-O model, the skill premium is expressed as
SPk =
wHk
wLk
=
ωy
1− ωy
(
Hk,y
Lk,y
)−1/σ
And in the stylized model, we have:
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SPk = (1− α) ωy
1− ωy
(
Zk
Hk
)ασ−1σ (Hk
Lk
)−1/σ
(3.1)
In the simplified model, there is no shifting of labor from one sector to the next. Therefore,
in the H-O analogue with only one sector, opening to trade does not affect the skill premium.
Equation 3.1 is reminiscent of the expression for the skill premium that is typically derived in
models of skill-biased technical change. From this expression, we can see that in the simple model
there are two forces at play. The first ratio, the ratio of technology to skilled workers
(
Zk
Hk
)
,
can be interpreted as the demand for skilled workers. The second ratio, the ratio of unskilled to
skilled workers
(
Lk
Hk
)
, is the relative supply of each kind of worker. In the most basic H-O model,
the skill premium is determined solely by the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers and
the skill-intensity of production. In the modified model, however, increasing technology serves
to increase the skill-intensity of production and so the demand for skilled workers changes as the
level of technology (Z) changes. Therefore, when Mexico begins to adopt the technology of the
U.S. final goods producer, the demand for skilled workers will increase and, as a result, so will
the skill premium. In the U.S., the increase in the skill premium is driven by the “investment
channel.” Because investment in ZU is decreasing in τZ , when the level of distortions to the use
of U.S. technology fall in Mexico, total investment in technology increases, thus increasing the
levelof technology in the U.S. Therefore, the ratio of technology to high skilled workers in the
United States
(
ZU
HU
)
must increase. In Mexico, instead, in the basic model, the skill premium
increases due to the “adoption channel.” The stock of technology in the U.S. is greater than that
in Mexico initially because there are more skilled workers in the U.S. than in Mexico. Therefore,
in the closed economy, technology is more productive in the U.S. and is accumulated to a greater
extent. When Mexican firms switch from less productive technology (ZM ) to more productive
technology (ZU ), the relative demand for skilled labor also increases in Mexico. The size of the
initial jump in the skill premium in Mexico will be equal to the difference in the initial steady
state levels of technology between the two countries. Then, the skill premium in Mexico will
continue to grow with the skill premium in the U.S. as ZU grows to its new steady state level.
So, the increase in the skill premium in Mexico is substantially larger than the increase in the
skill premium in the U.S.
In the full model, there is also a Stolper-Samuelson effect whereby workers are reallocated
towards sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage. However, this effect is offset
by the adoption of U.S. technology (ZU ) in Mexico. The extent to which this effect is offset is
dependent on the specific parametrization that is used. I will parametrize the model to match
some key observations in the “pre-reform” period and will conduct sensitivity analysis to show
82
how my results would change for different parameter choices. If technology’s share of income
(α) is low, for instance, the offsetting effects of technology adoption may not be large enough to
completely overturn the Stolper-Samuelson result. This is intuitive: If technology is relatively
unimportant in production, then having access to new technology will have little impact upon
the skill premium.
I now turn to the calibration of the model and the implications of the calibrated model
for the skill premium in both countries. Additionally, I discuss sensitivity of the results to the
selected parametrization.
3.5 Calibration and Quantitative Results
3.5.1 Calibration
I now calibrate the model to quantify the extent to which it can account for the increase in the
skill premia. Table 3.3 details the fixed parameter values chosen, as well as the source for these
parameter selections.
Parameter Value Source
β 0.96 Annual return on risk-free bonds
ρ, φ 0.63 Trade literature
δj 0.08 McGrattan & Prescott
AM 0.25 Relative value-added per worker in 1985
HU 0.28 CPS - Some College 1985
HM 0.10 ENOE - Some College 1985
LU 0.72 Normalize population to 1
LM 0.92 Normalize population to 1
Table 3.3: Fixed Parameter Values
Some of these parameters deserve discussion. In particular, I calculate the relative total
factor productivity (TFP) in Mexico (AM ) to be 0.25. Note that I normalize TFP in the United
States to be 1. I then calculate the relative value added per worker in the manufacturing sector
in Mexico in 1985. I choose the manufacturing sector instead of the overall economy because
my skill premium data pertains to the manufacturing sector only. For the relative supply of
high-skilled workers, I use the household surveys that are available for both countries. The data
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analogue to high-skilled workers are non-production employees. Since these are defined to be
managers and technicians, I look at individuals with some college. This includes individuals
with technical training. I do not want to rely on the ratio of non-production to production
employees in manufacturing because this is an equilibrium outcome which is reflective of the
skill intensity of manufacturing. While two countries have similar ratios of non-production to
production employees, the ratio of college to non-college individuals differs substantially. I need
this difference in order to rationalize the large observed difference in initial skill premia. The rate
of time discounting (β) and the substitutibility of intermediate goods (ρ, φ) are taken directly
from the literature. Although changing these parameters would affect the initial calibration, they
do not impact the results in terms of changes in skill premia. Moreover, the initial calibration
is not particularly sensitive to these parameter choices. As in McGrattan and Prescott (2009),
δj is not separately identified from α; the parameters jointly determine the return to technology
capital. I am going to hold fixed δ and conduct sensitivity analysis on α but it should be noted
that each value of α is dependent upon the associated rate of depreciation, δ.
Parameter Value Interpretation
ωx 0.45 Skilled Labor’s Share - Industry X
ωy 0.58 Skilled Labor’s Share - Industry Y
α 0.34 Technology Capital’s Share
σ 1.98 Elasticity of Substitution between H & L
Table 3.4: Calibrated Parameters
The most important parameters for the results are technology capital’s share of income (α)
and the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skill labor (σ). Also important are the
share parameters in the production function (ωx,ωy) which determine how skill intensive each
sector is. In order to pin these parameters down, I match three moments in the data: (1) the
ratio of royalties to payroll in Mexico in 1985; (2) the Mexican skill premium in 1985; and (3)
the U.S. skill premium in 1985. I estimate the parameters via the general method of moments
(GMM).
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Moment Data Model
Ratio of Royalties to Payroll - Mexico 1985 0.055 0.065
Skill Premium - Mexico 1985 2.03 2.03
Skill Premium - U.S. 1985 1.42 1.38
Table 3.5: Target Moments
Table 3.4 shows the parameter values resulting from the calibration exercise and Table 3.5
displays the targeted moments in the data and the model’s fit with them. I am able to exactly
match the level of the skill premium in Mexico in 1985, but the model does not exactly replicate
the other two moments. If I were to allow the substitution between skilled and unskilled workers
As Table 3.5 shows, the model exactly hits the target moments. The estimated elasticity of
substitution between high- and low-skill labor is in keeping with estimates from the literature.
I assume that the elasticity of substitution is the same across countries. Likewise, I assume
that technology’s share of income is the same across countries. I do this for two reasons. The
first is that I have data on royalty payments only for Mexican manufacturing. Because royalty
payments over payroll is the obvious data analogue to technology’s share of income, I want to
match this moment precisely in order to discipline α. In the absence of royalty data, I have no
way of pinning down this parameter. The second reason is that these two parameters (α, σ) are
the parameters to which my model results are most sensitive. I do not want the difference in
production functions to be driving the results. I will conduct sensitivity analysis to the choice
of these variables but will not allow them to vary across countries.
3.5.2 Results
I now conduct an experiment in which I move the countries from the fully closed economy
(autarky) to the one with no barriers to trade or technology flow (τy, τz = 0). This is the
extreme case and will serve as an illustration for how much of the skill premia increase can be
accounted for by the proposed mechanism.
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Closed Open %∆
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Mexico 2.03 2.03 3.1 2.8 50.4 39.4
U.S. 1.42 1.38 1.6 1.5 11.0 8.0
Table 3.6: Results: Autarky to Free Trade
As Table 3.6 shows, the model is able to capture over three quarters of the rise in the skill
premium in Mexico and about two thirds of the rise in the skill premium in the United States.
For contrast, in Table 3.7, I report the rise in the skill premium that occurs in the model without
technology capital. Notice that I only report the percent change between the closed and open
steady states. This is because the initial steady state in the closed economy without technology
capital will be different than the targeted values since I am running this particular experiment
using the parameter values which I calibrate to the model that includes technology capital. In
this case, the Stolper-Samuelson effect is present for Mexico; the skill premium in Mexico in the
open economy is 10% lower than it is in autarky. You will notice that, perhaps surprisingly, the
increase in the skill premium in the United States is less in the world without technology capital.
This is because intermediate inputs are relative complements; in the standard H-O model, there
are only two goods, which are substitutes for one another. Therefore, when industries integrate,
there is a tenancy for demand for the factors of production in both countries to move in the
same direction in the two countries. This implies that the fact that Industry Y integrates
is, in part, responsible for the skill premia moving in the same direction. In the absence of
technology capital, however, the increased (world) supply of unskilled workers dominates and
the skill premium falls. There are parameter values for which the skill premium rises in the
United States and falls in Mexico. However, the skill premium in the United States never rises
as much as it would in a world in which all goods are gross substitutes.
%∆
Data Model
With Z No Z
Mexico 50.4 39.4 −9.78
U.S. 11.0 8.0 1.00
Table 3.7: Results: With and Without Technology Capital
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Recall that this experiment is for the extreme case of complete autarky to fully open trade.
This may not be a bad exercise to do because in the early 1980s, Mexico was one of the most
closed economies in the world and by the late 1990s, it was one of the most open and in
many ways was almost completely integrated into the U.S. market. Notably, full adoption of the
intellectual property rights laws of the United States was part of the NAFTA agreement, though
Mexico began to adopt these laws as early as 1989 (DuMars, 1991). I view this adoption as one
of the important reduction in distortions that occurred to allow supply chains to integrate and
final goods producers to share technology with their intermediate goods producers.
Figure 3.6: Sensitivity to Changes in τZ
In Figure 3.6, I show the sensitivity of my results to the proposed change in τZ . Recall that
moving from autarky to free trade is essentially moving from a high level of distortions to no
distortions (τz high to τz = 0). Figure 3.6 shows how my results would change in a less extreme
case. Notice that if these distortions are sufficiently high (τz > 3) the Mexican intermediate
goods producing firms choose to specialize in producing intermediates for Mexican final goods
producers using Mexican technology. If the change in this distortion is sufficiently small, there
are no changes in the skill premium due to the “investment channel” in the United States.
This is because sufficiently small amounts of U.S. technology are adopted so that the return
on technology capital does not change. This, in turn, reduces the firms’ incentive to increase
investment, thus eliminating the investment channel. As discussed above, the skill premium
may rise as a result of integration of supply chains, depending on the relative complementarity
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of intermediate goods.
3.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The most important parameter for determining the change in the skill premium is α, as it
governs the importance of technology in production and its complementarity with high-skilled
labor. Figure 3.7(a) shows how the skill premium changes with α.
(a) Sensitivity to α
(b) Sensitivity to σ
Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of Change in Skill Premium to Technological Parameters
Notice that when α is very close to zero, the Stolper-Samuelson effect dominates and the
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skill premium in Mexico actually falls as Mexico integrates with the United States. However,
as α approaches one, the Stolper-Samuelson effect is no longer important and trade in ideas
dominates.
Also important for determining the change in the skill premium is σ, which dictates how
substitutable skilled and unskilled labor are. Figure 3.7(b) shows the sensitivity of the change
in the skill premium to this variable. Estimates in the data for σ range between 1.4 and about
2, so I show that range of value for σ on the x-axis of Figure 3.7(b). Because AM is the relative
productivity of Mexican manufacturing, which is greater than zero but less than one, I show
a range of values between 0 and 1 on the x-axis of Figure 3.8. In figure 3.7(b), we see that if
skilled and unskilled labor are more substitutable, the change in the skill premium is greater in
the open economy than if the two types of labor are less substitutable. Moreover, in Figure 3.8
if the countries have greater differences in their productivity, trade increases the skill premium
in Mexico by much more.
This exercise indicates the implications of the model for the impact of trade in technology
between two countries with similar productivities. In particular, if two advanced economies,
such as Canada and the United States, were to engage in trade in technology, it would be far
less likely that Canada would adopt the technology of the United States to the same extent
that Mexico did. The investment channel would still be at work, however, and so there could
be a modest rise in the skill level of technology capital in each country, depending on how
much of the American technology was used in Canada and vice versa. The increased marginal
return to technology capital of the final goods producer in the U.S. depends on the Canadian
intermediate’s willingness to switch from producing for the domestic final goods producer to
producing for the American final goods producer. Because the two countries would have initial
stocks of technology capital that would be similar, it is unlikely that the return to investing in
the technology would change substantially after liberalization. This is broadly consistent with
the data on the Canadian manufacturing skill premium following NAFTA. The skill premium
in Canada rose by an amount similar to the increase in the skill premium in the U.S.
89
Figure 3.8: Sensitivity of Changes in Skill Premium to AM
Now I show how the variables interact with one another. In particular, figure 3.9 shows the
interaction between α and σ. As both parameters increase, the change in the skill premium in
response to a trade liberalization increases. These parameters cannot be estimated individually
from the data, but will have to be determined jointly from a calibration procedure.
Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of Changes in Skill Premium to α and σ
The sensitivity analysis suggests that even for values of α and σ which are lower than the
calibrated values, the model can deliver growth in the skill premium of the sort that we observed
over the late 1980s and early 1990s in Mexico. Notice that the sensitivity analysis was all done
with respect to changes in the Mexican skill premium. A robust feature of the model is that it
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delivers a relatively larger increase in the skill premium in Mexico than in the United States,
which is a feature that other models of the skill premium lack. The disproportionate rise of
the skill premium that occurs in Mexico arises because of the adoption of the technology of
the U.S. producers. There is an investment effect on the skill premium in both countries, but
the majority of the increase in the skill premium in Mexico will come from the adoption of the
American technology.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that integration of supply chains is an important consideration for
the effects of trade liberalization on relative wages. The theoretical model that I use to generate
predictions for the changes in the skill premia following a trade liberalization is a standard
two-country trade model, modified to include technology capital which can be traded across
countries. I conclude that, once we consider the trade in technology that inherently occurs
as part of integrated supply chains, the increase in the skill premia in both the United States
and Mexico, with a disproportionate increase in the Mexican skill premium, is not a puzzle.
The model predicts that, while the skill premium rises in both countries, it rises in Mexico by
much more than the skill premium in the United States. I have provided evidence of supply
chain linkages, as well as evidence that these linkages are important predictors of technological
transfer and increasing skill premia. I have further shown that the patterns observed empirically
are quantitatively consistent with those predicted by this theory.
My model embeds the standard Heckscher-Ohlin forces and when I shut down the importance
of technology in production, I find the standard prediction of a falling skill premium in the Mexico
and a rising skill premium in the United States. Allowing for trade in technology overturns this
result because it allows for technology adoption in Mexico to spur increases in investment in that
same technology in the United States. A key reason that this was possible in the case of Mexico
is Mexico’s adherence to U.S. intellectual protection laws, which decreased the distortions to
using American technology in Mexico. This has implications for other trade relationships and
liberalizations. Perhaps the reason that we do not observe such large increases in the skill
premium in other developing countries as they open to trade is that trade in technology is
hindered by the lack of intellectual property protection in those countries. I plan to extend
the analysis to other countries whose skill premia rose following trade liberalization, such as
Chile and Colombia, but by much more modest amounts. As a first pass, it is evident that these
countries conduct far less intra-industry trade with the developed world than Mexico does, which
indicates that their firms are far less integrated into the supply chains of the United States.
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The framework developed here can be extended along a number of dimensions. An inter-
esting avenue for future research would be to model the strategic interaction between the final
goods producer and the intermediate goods producer which gives rise to the distortion on the use
of technology capital in the foreign country, τz. Better understanding of this relationship will
provide a framework to explore the disparate responses to trade liberalization across countries.
Another possible extension would be to allow for heterogeneity in some exogenous productivity
at the firm-level. Burstein and Vogel (2012) show that reallocation across firms can have an
impact on inequality at the household-level. Allowing for this feature in my current framework
would allow me to use more of the plant-level data to test the accuracy of the model. Moreover,
it would allow me to study how technology capital gets allocated across intermediate goods
producers in Mexico and, therefore, how this contributes to cross-plant variation in wages and
the skill premium. A third extension is to model the costs to the worker of changing sectors.
This will create cross-industry variation in wages and the skill premium, again allowing for more
external checks of the theory.
This paper provides a model for beginning to think about technological transfer and the
impact that this transfer has both upon countries that adopt it and upon the firms who invest
in it. I have demonstrated that technological transfer can play a big role in determining the skill
premia of countries that liberalize to one another. An interesting issue that remains is identifying
the reasons that technological transfer occurs to a lesser extent when certain countries open to
trade and the implications that this has for inequality.
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